45 4 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



not be determined or controlled by that symbol that state of conscious- 

 ness that mental part of the phenomena which we call volition. There- 

 fore, if from a voluntary movement we strike out the only mental part 

 the volition which, as we have seen, is not a factor, what is left is 

 as purely organic, and hence as purely reflex or automatic, as the 

 movements of a decapitated frog upon the application of an external 

 irritant. Of the truth of this we may satisfy ourselves by simply look- 

 ing at the nature of a voluntary movement from another point of view. 

 Thus, I will to move my arm, and it moves. The only voluntary part of 

 that very complex operation is the volition itself. I do not intentionally 

 and knowingly direct the nervous discharge along one set of nerves 

 rather than another, or upon one set of muscles rather than another ; 

 nor do I knowingly and intentionally cause one set to contract and 

 another to relax, or one to contract much, and another little, and 

 another less. All these things, which are so numerous and complicated 

 in that one movement, and which constitute the whole of the mechan- 

 ism, are purely automatic, being not in the least dependent upon the 

 mental part the volition although wholly dependent upon that or- 

 ganic activity of which the volition is a symbol in consciousness. It is 

 easy to understand, therefore, that if the molecular action which 

 generates the nervous force that causes a reflex movement could be 

 symbolized in consciousness, that symbol could not be called anything 

 but a volition a mandate for the movement. As many reflex move- 

 ments are movements which were once voluntary, and have become re- 

 flex by a withdrawal of them from the sphere of consciousness, to relate 

 them again to consciovisness would be to make them again voluntary. 

 While it is very easy to understand how a reflex movement might thus 

 be converted into, or restored back to, a voluntary movement, it is an 

 actual fact that by dislocating consciousness from its connections with 

 voluntary movements we at once make them reflex or automatic, as is 

 the case, for example, in many habitual or oft-repeated movements, such 

 as the fingering of the keys of a piano when the music is known by 

 heart. The following singular case is also in point : Many years ago, a 

 medical gentleman related to me a case which came under his own ob- 

 servation, namely, that of a lawyer, who, without any other perceptible 

 physical or mental disorder, would, in the course of ordinary conversa- 

 tion, let slip one or another legal term between words and in sentences 

 with which it had no connection whatever. They seemed to utter 

 themselves without any volition on his part, and in fact he did not know 

 that one was coming until it was pronounced. The muscular move- 

 ments in such cases are wholly automatic, which means wholly organic, 

 without any associated mental phenomena. 



From the foreg'oinfr considerations it is evident that a scientific solu- 

 tion of the problem of voluntary motion (and that of the will which is 

 based upon it) requires a full and separate consideration and explana- 

 tion of four distinct branches of the subject, namely : 



