ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE. 475 



sis to Deduction. Daroco and Bocardo are based upon the fact that if 

 the truth of a conclusion necessarily follows from the truth of a premise, 

 then the falsity of the premise follows from the falsity of the conclusion. 

 This is always true. It is different when the inference is only probable. 

 It by no means follows that, because the truth of a certain premise 

 would render the truth of a conclusion probable, therefore the fal- 

 sity of the conclusion renders the falsity of the premise probable. At 

 least, this is only true, as we have seen in a former paper, when the 

 word probable is used in one sense in the antecedent and in another in 

 the consequent. 



III. 



A certain anonymous writing is upon a torn piece of paper. It is 

 suspected that the author is a certain person. His desk, to which only 

 he has had access, is searched, and in it is found a piece of paper, the 

 torn edge of which exactly fits, in all its irregularities, that of the paper 

 in question. It is a fair hypothetic inference that the suspected man 

 was actually the author. The ground of this inference evidently is that 

 two torn pieces of paper are extremely unlikely to fit together by acci- 

 dent. Therefore, of a great number of inferences of this sort, but a 

 very small proportion would be deceptive. The analogy of hypothesis 

 with induction is so strong that some logicians have confounded them. 

 Hypothesis has been called an induction of characters. A number of 

 characters belonging to a certain class are found in a certain object ; 

 whence it is inferred that all the characters of that class .belong to the 

 object in question. This certainly involves the same principle as induc- 

 tion ; yet in a modified form. In the first place, characters are not 

 susceptible of simple enumeration like objects ; in the next place, 

 characters run in categories. When we make an hypothesis like that 

 about the piece of paper, we only examine a single line of characters, 

 or perhaps two or three, and we take no specimen at all of others. If 

 the hypothesis were nothing but an induction, all that we should be 

 justified in concluding, in the example above, would be that the two 

 pieces of paper which matched in such irregularities as have been ex- 

 amined would be found to match in other, say slighter, irregularities. 

 The inference from the shape of the paper to its ownership is precisely 

 what distinguishes hypothesis from induction, and makes it a bolder 

 and more perilous step. 



The same warnings that have been given against imagining that 

 induction rests upon the uniformity of Nature might be repeated in 

 regard to hypothesis. Here, as there, such a theory not only utterly 

 fails to account for the validity of the inference, but it also gives rise to 

 methods of conducting it which are absolutely vicious. There are, no 

 doubt, certain uniformities in Nature, the knowledge of which will for- 

 tify an hypothesis very much. For example, we suppose that iron, tita- 

 nium, and other metals exist in the sun, because we find in the solar 



