662 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



is of consequence as the starting-point wherefrom to count the efficacy 

 of deprivations. The pains opposed to the pleasures of self-esteem and 

 praise are among the most powerful weapons in the armory of the dis- 

 ciplinarian. They are the chief reliance of such as deprecate corporeal 

 inflictions. Bentham's elaborate scheme of discipline in the " Chres- 

 tomathia"is a manipulation of the motives of praise and dispraise, 

 which he would fain make us believe to be all-sufficient. 



Of the two divisions of the present class of emotions, namely, self- 

 esteem on the one hand, and desire of praise on the other, the opposite 

 of the first self-reproach, self-humbling is very little under foreign 

 influence. To induce people to think meanly of themselves is no easy 

 task; with the mass of human beings it is wellnigh hopeless. Any 

 success that attends the endeavor is an offshoot from the second mem- 

 ber of the class under discussion, namely, dispraise, depreciation. There 

 is no mistaking our aim here ; we can make our power felt in this form, 

 whether it has the other effect or not. People live so much on one an- 

 other's good opinion that the remission tells in an instant ; from the 

 simple abatement or loss of estimation there is a descent into the depths 

 of disesteem with a result of unspeakable suffering. The efforts that 

 the victim makes to right himself under censure only show how keenly 

 it is felt. There can be little doubt that on the delicate handling 

 of this instrument must depend the highest refinements of moral 

 control. 



The Emotions of Intellect. The pleasurable emotions incident 

 to the exercise of the intellectual powers have not the formidable 

 magnitude that we have assigned to the foregoing groups. Indeed, on 

 the occasions when they seem to burst forth with an intense glow, we 

 can discern the presence of emanations from these other great foun- 

 tains of feeling. 



It is an effort of prime importance to trace exhaustively the induce- 

 ments and allurements to intellectual exertion. What are the intrinsic 

 charms of knowledge, whether in pursuit or in possession ? The diffi- 

 culty of the answer is increased rather than diminished by the flow of 

 fifty years' rhetoric. 



Knowledge has such a wide compass, embraces such various ingre- 

 dients, that, until we discriminate the kinds of it, we cannot speak pre- 

 cisely either of its charms or of its absence of charm. Some sorts of 

 knowledge are interesting to everybody ; some interest only a few. 

 The serious part of the case is, that the most valuable kinds of knowl- 

 edge are often the least interesting. 



The important distinction to be drawn here is between individual 

 or concrete knowledge and general or abstract knowledge. As a rule, 

 particulars are interesting as well as easy ; generals uninteresting and 

 hard. When particulars are not interesting, it is often from their be- 

 ing overshadowed by generals. When generals are made interesting, 

 it is by a happy reflected influence upon the particulars. It would serve 



