GENESIS OF DISINTERESTED BENEVOLENCE. 737 



But it is not from this simplest form of the mental quality that 

 moral benevolence takes its rise. Besides the confusion just spoken 

 of, there is another, the outflow and consequence of that between body 

 and mind, nearly as common among children and uneducated men. It 

 is the confusion between the acts of ourself, of our mind, and those of 

 our body ; between intended effects and willed acts. 



This confusion is to be found in the laws of all rude and semi-bar- 

 barous nations. Their criminal codes punish the result of an act irre- 

 spective of the intention of the agent ; they make, for instance, no dif- 

 ference between murder and manslaughter. In more civilized countries, 

 where generations of lawgivers have for centuries developed the theory 

 of criminal responsibility, the law is even now far from perfect. The 

 result of an act, even when not intended, continues to be taken into 

 account for punishment. A man who would be let off with a small fine 

 for an illegal act producing no direct harm would be fined more heavily, 

 or even imprisoned, if by such an act some harm were unintentionally 

 done. Even if the legislator wished to correct this irrational state of 

 the law, the general opinion of the uneducated majority would prevent 

 him from doing so. It will be long ere the theory of criminal responsi- 

 bility is generally understood. 



But if in criminal law, which it is the interest of so many persons 

 to clear up, the confusion still exists, how much the more will it con- 

 tinue in those matters where no great interest is at stake! If a man 

 kills another man, fear of punishment, fear of his own conscience, will 

 prompt him to consider whether the death was intended or not, whether 

 he is guilty of murder or of simple manslaughter. But, if a man by 

 mere chance does some good to another man, there is nothing which 

 incites him to a similar mental effort, while on the contrary the agree- 

 able sense of power which the consciousness of the effect produces, the 

 gratitude of the benefited individual and the approbation of society, 

 will make the idea that he is the author of the benefit pleasant to him 

 and prevent him from too closely analyzing his motives. He will easily 

 assume that he is the author of the benefit, and so it happens that, when 

 an act of his body has produced a beneficial result upon some one else, 

 an average man thinks that he himself has done good to that indi- 

 vidual. 



From this confusion real disinterested benevolence will take its 

 origin. The agreeable sense of power, produced by the unintended 

 beneficial effect, will continue as long as the agent can remember that 

 effect. This, however, will only be the case if the benefit persists for 

 some time, so that it may hereafter be remembered, and it will be all 

 the more the case if that benefit continues for a long time so as to be 

 actually perceived. There is, then, an inducement so to act that it may 

 persist. This inducement is of course very weak at first, and will pro- 

 duce no action if there is not a considerable spontaneous energy. But 

 there is already a germ of benevolence, the wish that a benefit con- 

 vol. xiii, 47 



