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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



whose lamps are empty and untrimmed, 

 and who, on a sudden call, can only 

 stumble about in darkness. Evolution- 

 ary ethics are not discredited because 

 there are those whose imperfect moral 

 development craves inducements and 

 restraints of. a more imperative nature 

 than any system which appeals merely 

 to reason and good feeling can supply. 

 "But why," our correspondent may 

 ask, "do you bring in good feeling? 

 My complaint is precisely that, while 

 the evolutionary system professes to 

 dispense with feeling, it does not and 

 can not really do so." "We know this 

 is a common idea, but it is not a correct 

 one. Feeling arises when habits have 

 become so consolidated that their origin 

 and justification, if not forgotten, are at 

 least overlooked, so that they seem to 

 be, as it were, self -justified. Feelings 

 and prejudices are of kindred nature: 

 where there is feeling there is, gener- 

 ally speaking, prejudice ; where there is 

 prejudice there is always feeling. In 

 feeling we have the stored-up energy of 

 repeated perceptions, and it acts as a 

 fly-wheel to carry us past many a dead 

 point of balanced calculations. The 

 evolutionist shows that moral actions 

 are those which specifically tend to pro- 

 duce happiness to make life as a whole 

 not only worth living but capable of 

 being lived, if we may be allowed the 

 expression. We all want life, and we 

 want it more abundantly. Evolution- 

 ary ethics show how life in general is 

 promoted and enlarged by certain acts, 

 how it is impeded and straitened and 

 undermined by others; nor can there 

 be any reasonable doubt as to the valid- 

 ity of the classification thus established. 

 Mr. Spencer does not say to each indi- 

 vidual, " You will in every case find 

 your personal happiness promoted by 

 every moral act you may perform, and 

 the more moral you are the happier you 

 will surely be." He might, however, 

 say : " In performing any moral act 

 from a moral motive you will be sure to 

 reap a certain satisfaction the satisfac- 



tion that comes from having placed 

 yourself in harmony with a law that 

 you feel to be universal in its applica- 

 tion ; but whether," he might add, 

 " your happiness as a whole will be pro- 

 moted will depend upon how far in 

 your particular case such satisfaction 

 outweighs any loss or suffering which 

 the performance of the act may entail. 

 That is not a question that can be set- 

 tled on general grounds ; it depends on 

 an equation in which your own moral 

 nature as at present developed is the 

 most important element." In order to 

 determine whether an act is a moral act, 

 what we have to do is to fix its relation 

 to life as a whole, its specific tendency 

 to promote or diminish happiness. To 

 trace its thousand possible incidences 

 in individual cases would be beyond hu- 

 man wisdom, and would be of little 

 value if accomplished. To appeal to 

 right feeling to come back to a point 

 that ought to be made very clear is to 

 appeal to a force that we know to have 

 been accumulated through the perform- 

 ance of right acts acts which, each in 

 their own hour, have yielded up to the 

 moral nature the satisfaction that comes 

 from right conduct, and thus furnished 

 a fund of virtuous impulse for future 

 use. Far, therefore, from there being 

 any incompatibility between the sanc- 

 tion of reason and the sanction of feel- 

 ing, the two are but one sanction ; the 

 only difference being that one is special 

 to the act at the moment under consid- 

 eration, while the other is the great 

 closed register of past moral judgments. 

 Of course, it is open to any man to 

 say : " There is no morality in my com- 

 position, no feeling or prejudice in favor 

 of what you call right courses of action, 

 no perception of anything as desira- 

 ble that does not make for my personal 

 gratification ; and therefore to me your 

 scientific morality is equally without 

 meaning and without authority." A 

 man who spoke in that way would 

 probably libel himself; but, in so far as 

 we assume that he speaks the truth, we 



