82 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



of reflecting upon their past conduct, then no animals can possess a 

 moral sense, properly so called. And from this, of course, it follows 

 that, if any animals can be shown to possess a moral sense, they 

 are thereby also shown to be capable of reflecting upon their past 

 conduct. 



Again, if Mr. Darwin's theory concerning the origin and develop- 

 ment of the moral sense is true, it is self-evident that we should not 

 expect to find any indications of this faculty in animals that are either 

 unsocial or unsympathetic. Supposing the theory true, therefore, our 

 search for animals in which we may expect to find any indications of 

 a moral sense is thus seen to be very restricted in its range : we can 

 only expect to find such indications in animals that are highly intel- 

 ligent, social, and sympathetic. Since, by the hypothesis, conscience 

 requires a comparatively rare collocation of conditions for its develop- 

 ment, we must expect to find it a comparatively rare product. 



Lastly, as it is quite certain that no animal is capable of reflecting 

 upon past conduct in any high degree, and as we have just seen that 

 the moral sense depends upon the faculty of so reflecting, it follows 

 that we cannot expect to find any animal in which the moral sense 

 attains any high degree of development. 



We are now in a position to draw some important distinctions. 

 There are several instincts and feelings which, when expressed in out- 

 ward action, more or less simulate conscience (so to speak), but which 

 it would be erroneous to call by that name. For instance, the mater- 

 nal instinct, although it leads in many cases to severe and sustained 

 self-denial for the benefit of the offspring, is nevertheless clearly dis- 

 tinct from conscience. The mother in tending her young does so in 

 obedience to an inherited instinct, and not from any fear of subsequent 

 self-reproach if she leaves her family to perish. She follows the ma- 

 ternal instinct, so long as it continues in operation, just as she would 

 follow any other instinct; and it is, as it were, a mere accident of the 

 case that in this particular instance the course of action which the 

 instinct prompts is a course of action which is conducive to the wel- 

 fare of others. An illustration will render this distinction more clear. 

 In his chapter on the "Moral Sense," Mr. Darwin alludes to the con- 

 flict of instincts which sometimes occurs in swallows when the miscra- 

 tory season overtakes a late brood of young birds; at such times 

 " swallows, house-martins, and swifts, frequently desert their tender 

 young, leaving them to perish miserably in their nests." And further 

 on he remarks: " When arrived at the end of their long journey, and 

 the migratory instinct has ceased to act, what an agony of remorse 

 the bird would feel if, from being endowed with great mental activity, 

 she could not prevent the image constantly passing through her mind 

 of her young ones perishing in the bleak north from cold and hunger ! " 

 In other words, if we could suppose the mother-bird under such cir- 

 cumstances to be capable of reflecting upon her past conduct, and, as 



