CONSCIENCE IN ANIMALS. 83 



a consequence, suffering an " agony of remorse," then the bird might 

 properly be said to be conscience-stricken. And if we could suppose 

 the bird, while still brooding over her young ones, to foresee the agony 

 of remorse she would subsequently feel if she now yields to the stronger 

 instinct by deserting her young, then the bird might properly be said 

 to be acting conscientiously. 



Again, mere fear of punishment must not be confused with con- 

 science it being of the essence of conscientious action that it should 

 be prompted by feelings wholly distinct from fear of retaliation by 

 the object of injury, whether by way of punishment or revenge. Con- 

 science must be capable of effecting its own punishment if violated; 

 otherwise the principle of action, whatever it may be, must be called 

 by some other name. 1 



It is evident that conscience, as we find it in ourselves, is distinct 

 from love of approbation and fear of disapprobation. Nevertheless, 

 if our hypothesis concerning the development of the moral sense is the 

 true one, we should expect that during the early phases of that devel- 

 opment love of approbation and fear of disapprobation should have 

 played a large part in the formation of conscience. For although, by 

 the hypothesis, it is sympathy and not self-love that constitutes the 

 seat of the moral sense, still the particular manifestations of self-love 

 with which we are now concerned viz., desire of approbation and dis- 

 like of the reverse would clearly be impossible but for the presence 

 of sympathy. "Mr. Bain has clearly shown that the love of praise, 

 and the strong feeling of glory, and the still stronger horror of scorn 

 and infamy, ' are due to the workings of sympathy.' " 2 I think, there- 

 fore, that in testing by observations upon the lower animals the 

 truth of Mr. Darw T in's theory concerning the genesis of conscience, it 

 would be no valid objection to any satisfactory instances of conscien- 

 tious action in an animal to say that such action is partly due to a de- 

 sire of praise or a fear of blame. This would be no valid objection, 

 because, in the first place, it would in most cases be impossible to say 

 how far the implication is tjrae rhow far the animal may have acted 

 from pure sympathy or regard for the feelings of others, and how far 

 from an admixture of sympathy with self-love; and in the next place, 

 even if the implication be conceded wholly true, it would not tend to 

 disprove the theory in question. If an animal's sympathies are so 

 powerful that, even after being reflected through self-love, they still 

 retain force enough to prompt a course of action which is in direct op- 

 position to the more immediate dictates of self-love, then the sympa- 

 thies of such an animal are hereby proved to be sufficiently exalted to 



1 Of course I recognize fear of punishment as an important factor in the original con~ 

 stitution of the moral sentiment ; but, for reasons stated at the end of this article, we 

 must, when treating of animal psychology, eliminate this factor when conscience has become 

 siifficiently developed to be "a law to itself." 



' Desceut of Man," p. 109 (1874). " Mental and Moral Science," p, 254 (1808). 



a a 



