84 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



constitute the beginnings of a conscience, supposing the theory which 

 we are testing to be the true one. 



Similarly, there is an obvious distinction in ourselves between in- 

 jured conscience and injured pride. But, if conscience has been devel- 

 oped in the way here supposed, it follows that in the rudimentary 

 stages of such development the distinction in question cannot be so 

 well defined. Pride presupposes consideration for the opinion of 

 others, and this in turn as we have just seen presupposes sympathy, 

 which is the foundation-stone of conscience. M ow, it is certain that 

 long before we reach, in the ascending scale of animal psychology, in- 

 tellectual faculties sufficiently exalted to admit even of our suspecting 

 the presence of an incipient moral sense, we can perceive abundant 

 indications of the presence of pride. And, forasmuch as animals that 

 are high in the psychological scale frequently exhibit a very profound 

 appreciation of their own dignity, we may pretty safely conclude that 

 in no case can we expect to find indications of a moral sense in an ani- 

 mal without a greater or less admixture of pride. 



I will now sum up this rather tedious preamble : From Mr. Dar- 

 win's theory concerning the develoj)ment of conscience, it appears 

 to follow that the presence of this faculty in animals must be restrict- 

 ed if it occurs at all to those which are intelligent enough to be ca- 

 pable in some degree of reflecting upon past conduct, and which like- 

 wise possess social and sympathetic instincts. From the first of these 

 conditions it follows, supposing Mr. Darwin's theory true, that in the 

 case of no animal should we expect to find the moral sense developed 

 in any other than a low degree. 



There is no reason to suppose any mere instinct (such as the ma- 

 ternal) due to conscience; for an instinct acquired by inheritance is 

 obeyed blindly, in order to avoid the uncomfortable sensation which 

 ensues in a direct manner if it is not so obeyed ; whereas conscience 

 enforces obedience only through a process of reflection ; ' the uncom- 

 fortable sensation which non-obedience entails in this case being only 

 brought about in an indirect manner through the agency of repre- 

 sentative thought. 



Although conscience in man is independent of, or distinct from, 

 love of approbation, fear of reproach, and sense of pride, there is no 

 reason why we should suppose conscience in its rudimentary forms to 

 be independent of these passions. On the contrary, I think we shoidd 

 expect a rudimentary form of conscience to be more or less amalga- 

 mated with such passions; for, long before the faculty in question has 

 attained the highly-differentiated state in which we find it to be pres- 

 ent in ourselves, it must (by the hypothesis) have passed through in- 



1 i. e., originally : when once the hahit of yielding obedience to conscience has been 

 acquired, it becomes itself of the nature of an instinct neglect to practise this habit giv- 

 ing rise immediately, or without any process of reflection, to an uncomfortable state of 

 the mind. 



