SCIENCE AND THE LOGICIANS. 225 



nor is there even a more intelligent rendering of an old meaning. In 

 our own opinion the distinction between the comprehension and the 

 extension of propositions is important ; but it is paraded with too 

 much ostentation, and treated with too much prolixity. Hamilton's 

 great virtue is his clearness of statement and exhaustiveness of treat- 

 ment. His method is admirable. Sometimes, - however, there is too 

 much display of his own erudition. 



But even in the domain of formal logic Hamilton is not the only 

 one that has within the present century made important additions. 

 Prominent among these is De Morgan. Especially valuable are his 

 discussions upon the different values of the logical copula. Prof. 

 Boole has also made important additions to the syllogism, and has 

 most ably supported the theory of the -common ground occupied by 

 logic and the mathematics. Prof. Bam also, in pure logic, has made 

 a most important generalization. Hamilton's three laws of thought, 

 namely, identity, noncontradiction, and excluded middle, he has re- 

 duced to the single law or canon of consistency. 



So much for the assertion that Hamilton was the only man in 

 twenty-two centuries to make any important additions to the imperial 

 science of logic. Like enough the doctor would exclude scientific 

 method from the imperial science. Perhaps he regards formal logic 

 alone fit to wear the purple. But even here we see that there can be 

 no such claim set up. If, however, he could claim this distinction, it 

 would afford no reason for receiving his definition of science without 

 question. That should stand or fall wholly upon its own merits. 

 The greatest of men are not without personal biases. It is well known 

 that Hamilton had a metaphysical bias. In his work on metaphysics 

 the first three lectures are occupied in attempting to prove the supe- 

 riority of mental science over natural science. He quotes with much 

 approval this ancient declaration, " On earth there is nothing great 

 but man, in man there is nothing great but mind." This being his 

 known bias, before examining the definition, an investigator of Na- 

 ture, a believer in scientific method, might have thought that it 

 was by no means certain that he " could afford " to take it simply 

 on his authority. However, when we come to the definition itself, 

 the matter of it is well enough. But we have the temerity to suggest 

 that its form might be improved without changing the substance. It 

 is too pedantic and prolix. It is not in a shape easily to be remem- 

 bered. We would render it thus : Science is real Jcyiowledge logically 

 classified. But, as Bain remarks, positive definition is not thorough 

 enough. As he says in his second canon on definition, it is needful 

 to assemble for comparison the particulars of the contrasting or op- 

 posed notion. "We can never know distinctly what a notion is until 

 we contrast it with its opposite. Knowing is discriminating. What 

 is not science ? What is the other notion that lies side by side with 

 it in contrast, but contained under the same genus ? Now, if we 



VOL. IX. 15 



