SCIENCE AND THE LOGICIANS. 229 



parts, and to establish their exact relations. He compares, adds, sub- 

 tracts, multiplies, divides. In order to communicate his knowledge 

 of the relation of parts, he must use words ; these words he must de- 

 fine, if their meaning is not obvious to the one instructed. But if the 

 property is of a primary nature, and given in the experience of every 

 one, there is no need of definition, and indeed no rational definition 

 can be given. This is true alike of the notions, extension, surface, 

 line, and point. Each of these is as much a datum of simple experi- 

 ence as the notion of white or blue ; and it is just as absurd to at- 

 tempt to define the one class of concepts as the other. They may be, 

 however, brought out a little more closely by contrasting the correla- 

 tives in the manner that we have attempted with extension and indefi- 

 nite space. Thus surface may be contrasted with the solid volume, 

 or definite space, of which it forms the boundary; line with surface, 

 of which it in turn is the boundary ; and, lastly, point with line, of 

 which it is the termination or the where of separation. It is not true 

 that the existence of forms depends upon the motions of points. 

 Forms are given in experience through sensation. A point is the 

 ultimate step in the analysis of boundaries. It is sheer nonsense to 

 attempt to construct lines out of points, surfaces out of lines, and 

 volumes out of surfaces. All that it is necessary to say further upon 

 this subject is, that the differentiae of the higher mathematics are not 

 nothings, but quantities the least conceivable. The least conceivable 

 portion of a line is not a point ; the least conceivable portion of a 

 surface is not a line ; the least conceivable portion of a volume is not 

 a surface, for the simple reason that no portion of a thing can be its 

 boundary. 



Now, in conclusion, we say that geometry rests upon no affirma- 

 tions in respect to the infinite, but, on the contrary, it is wholly occu- 

 pied about the relations of the finite in space. We have the assurance 

 from the doctor that the finite is the sphere of every science, while the 

 sphere of religion is the infinite. This certainly would cast theology 

 out of the sphere of science, for the doctor has laid down as one of 

 its fundamental concepts, " God is an infinite person." Sir William 

 Hamilton's definition, in its very first clause, also excludes theology 

 from science, if we take himself as authority for the meaning of the 

 term cognition. Every cognition is simply a perception of relation. 

 The infinite and absolute equal God are not thinkable. Hence the- 

 ology can have no " complement of cognition " out of which to classify 

 a science. 



In another place we find that the ciy of conflict has its origin in 

 confounding theology with religion. "Theology is not religion any 

 more than psychology is human life, or zoology animal life, or botany 

 plant-life. Theology is objective, religion is subjective. Theology is 

 the scientific classification of what is known of God ; religion is a 

 loving obedience to God's commandments. Every religious man 



