392 GENERAL SUMMARY Part II. 



his past and future actions and motives, — of approving 

 of some and disapproving of others ; and the fact that 

 man is the one being who with certainty can be thus 

 designated makes the greatest of all distinctions be- 

 tween him and the lower animals. But in our third 

 chapter I have endeavoured to shew that the moral 

 sense follows, firstly, from the enduring and always 

 present nature of the social instincts, in which respect 

 man agrees with the lower animals ; and secondly, from 

 his mental faculties being highly active and his impres- 

 sions of past events extremely vivid, in which respects 

 he differs from the lower animals. Owing to this con- 

 dition of mind, man cannot avoid looking backwards and 

 comparing the impressions of past events and actions. 

 He also continually looks forward. Hence after some 

 temporary desire or passion has mastered his social in- 

 stincts, he will reflect and compare the now weakened 

 impression of such past impulses, with the ever present 

 social instinct ; and he will then feel that sense of dis- 

 satisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind 

 them. Consequently he resolves to act differently for 

 the future — and this is conscience. Any instinct which 

 is permanently stronger or more enduring than another, 

 gives rise to a feeling which we express by saying that 

 it ought to be obeyed. A pointer dog, if able to reflect 

 on his past conduct, would say to himself, I ought (as 

 indeed we say of him) to have pointed at that hare 

 and not have yielded to the passing temptation of 

 hunting it. 



Social animals are partly impelled by a wish to aid 

 the members of the same community in a general 

 manner, but more commonly to perform certain definite 

 actions. Man is impelled by the same general wish to 

 aid his fellows, but has few or no special instincts. 

 He diflers also from the lower animals in being able 



