Chap. XXI. AND CONCLUDING EEMAKKS. 393 



to express his desires by words, wliicli thus become 

 the guide to the aid required and bestowed. The 

 motive to give aid is likewise somewhat modified in 

 man : it no longer consists solely of a blind instinctive 

 impulse, but is largely influenced by the praise or 

 blame of his fellow men. Both the appreciation and 

 the bestowal of praise and blame rest on sympathy ; 

 and this emotion, as we have seen, is one of the most 

 important elements of the social instincts. Sympathy, 

 though gained as an instinct, is also much strengthened 

 by exercise or habit. As all men desire their own 

 happiness, praise or blame is bestowed on actions and 

 motives, according as they lead to this end ; and as 

 happiness is an essential part of the general good, the 

 gi'eatest-happiness principle indirectly serves as a nearly 

 safe standard of right and wrong. As the reasoning 

 powers advance and experience is gained, the more 

 remote effects of certain lines of conduct on the 

 character of the individual, and on the general good, 

 are perceived ; and then the self-regarding virtues, 

 from coming within the scope of public opinion, receive 

 praise, and their opposites receive blame. But with the 

 less civilised nations reason often errs, and many bad 

 customs and base superstitions come within the same 

 scope, and consequently are esteemed as high virtues, 

 and their breach as heavy crimes. 



The moral faculties are generally esteemed, and with 

 justice, as of higher value than the intellectual powers. 

 But we should always bear in mind that the activity of 

 the mind in vividly recalling past impressions is one of 

 the fundamental though secondary bases of conscience. 

 This fact affords the strongest argument for educating 

 and stimulating in all possible ways the intellectual 

 faculties of every human beino-. No doubt a man with 

 a torpid mind, if his social affections and sympathies are 



