Chap. III.] MORAL SENSE. 85 



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trary, we all feel that an act cannot be considered as per- 

 fect, or as performed in the most noble manner, unless it 

 be done impulsively, without deliberation or effort, in the 

 same manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities 

 are innate. He who is forced to overcome his fear or want 

 of sympathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way 

 higher credit than the man whose innate disposition leads 

 him to a good act without effort. As we cannot distin- 

 guish between motives, we rank all aotions of a certain 

 class as moral, when they are performed by a moral being. 

 A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past 

 and future actions or motives, and of approving or disap- 

 proving of them. We have no reason to suppose that any 

 of the lower animals have this capacity ; therefore when 

 a monkey faces danger to rescue its comrade, or takes 

 charge of an orphan-monkey, we do not call its conduct 

 moral. But in the case of man, who alone can with cer- 

 tainty be ranked as a moral being, actions of a certain 

 class are called moral, whether performed deliberately 

 after a struggle with opposing motives, or from the effects 

 of slowly-gained habit, or impulsively through instinct. 



But to return to our more immediate subject ; although 

 some instincts are more powerful than others, thus leading 

 to corresponding actions, yet it cannot be maintained that 

 the social instincts are ordinarily stronger in man, or have 

 become stronger through long-continued habit, than the 

 instincts, for instance, of self-preservation, hunger, lust, 

 vengeance, etc. Why, then, does man regret, even 

 though he may endeavor to banish any such regret, that 

 he has followed the one natural impulse, rather than the 

 other ; and why does he further feel that he ought to re- 

 gret his conduct ? Man in this respect differs profoundly 

 from the lower animals. Nevertheless we can, I think, 

 see with some degree of clearness the reason of this dif- 

 ference. 



