70 THE DESCENT OF MAN. Part I. 



CHAPTER III. 



Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the 

 Lower Animals — continued. 



The moral sense — Fundamental proposition — The qualities of social 

 animals — Origin of sociability — Struggle between opposed in- 

 stincts — Man a social animal — The more enduring social instincts 

 conquer other less persistent instincts — The social virtues alone 

 regarded by savages— -The self-regarding virtues acquired at a 

 later stage of development — The importance of the judgment 

 of the members of the same community on conduct — Trans- 

 mission of moral tendencies — Summary. 



I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers 1 

 who maintain that of all the differences between man 

 and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience 

 is by far the most important. This sense, as Mack- 

 intosh 2 remarks, "has a rightful supremacy over every 

 " other principle of human action ; " it is summed up 

 in that short but imperious word ought, so full of high 

 significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes 

 of man, leading him without a moment's hesitation 

 to risk his life for that of a fellow- creature; or after 

 due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling 

 of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause. 

 Immanuel Kant exclaims, " Duty ! Wondrous thought, 

 " that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor 

 " by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked 

 " law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always 



1 See, for instance, on this subject, Quatrefages, ' Unite de PEspece 

 Humaine,' 1861, p. 21, &c. 



* ' Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy,' 1837, p. 231, &c. 



