Chap. III. MORAL SENSE. 87 



The more enduring Social Instincts conquer the less 

 Persistent Instincts. — We have, however, not as yet con- 

 sidered the main point, on which the whole question of 

 the moral sense hinges. Why should a man feel that 

 he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than 

 another ? Why does he bitterly regret if he has yielded 

 to the strong sense of self-preservation, and has not 

 risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature ; or why 

 does he regret having stolen food from severe hunger? 



It is evident in the first place, that with mankind the 

 instinctive impulses have different degrees of strength ; 

 a young and timid mother urged by the maternal in- 

 stinct will, without a moment's hesitation, run the 

 greatest danger for her infant, but not for a mere fel- 

 low-creature. Many a man, or even boy, who never 

 before risked his life for another, but in whom courage 

 and sympathy were well developed, has, disregarding the 

 instinct of self-preservation, instantaneously plunged 

 into a torrent to save a drowning fellow-creature. In 

 this case man is impelled by the same instinctive mo- 

 tive, which caused the heroic little American monkey, 

 formerly described, to attack the great and dreaded 

 baboon, to save his keeper. Such actions as the above 

 appear to be the simple result of the greater strength of 

 the social or maternal instincts than of any other instinct 

 or motive ; for they are performed too instantaneously 

 for reflection, or for the sensation of pleasure or pain ; 

 though if prevented distress would be caused. 



I am aware that some persons maintain that actions 

 performed impulsively, as in the above cases, do not 

 come under the dominion of the moral sense, and 

 cannot be called moral. They confine this term to 

 actions done deliberately, after a victory over opposing 

 desires, or to actions prompted by some lofty motive. 

 But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear line 



