88 THE DESCENT OF MAN. Part I. 



of distinction of this kind ; though the distinction may 

 be real. As far as exalted motives are concerned, many 

 instances have been recorded of barbarians, destitute of 

 any feeling of general benevolence towards mankind, 

 and not guided by any religious motive, who have deli- 

 berately as prisoners sacrificed their lives, 21 rather than 

 betray their comrades ; and surely their conduct ought 

 to be considered as moral. As far as deliberation and 

 the victory over opposing motives are concerned, ani- 

 mals may be seen doubting between opposed instincts, 

 as in rescuing their offspring or comrades from dan- 

 ger ; yet their actions, though done for the good of 

 others, are not called moral. Moreover, an action 

 repeatedly performed by us, will at last be done with- 

 out deliberation or hesitation, and can then hardly be 

 distinguished from an instinct ; yet surely no one will 

 pretend that an action thus done ceases to be moral. 

 On the contrary, we all feel that an act cannot be 

 considered as perfect, or as performed in the most 

 noble manner, unless it be done impulsively, without 

 deliberation or effort, in the same manner as by a man 

 in whom the requisite qualities are innate. He 

 who is forced to overcome his fear or want of sym- 

 pathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way 

 higher credit than the man whose innate disposition 

 leads him to a good act without effort. As we cannot 

 distinguish between motives, we rank all actions of a 

 certain class as moral, when they are performed by 

 a moral being. A moral being is one who is capable of 

 comparing his past and future actions or motives, and 

 of approving or disapproving of them. We have no 

 reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have 



21 I have given one such case, namely of three Patagonian Indians 

 who preferred being shot, one after the other, to betraying the plans of 

 their companions in war (, Journal of Researches,' 1845,. p. 103). 



