Chap. III. MORAL SENSE. 89 



this capacity ; therefore when a monkey faces danger 

 to rescue its comrade, or takes charge of an orphan- 

 monkey, we do not call its conduct moral. But in the 

 case of man, who alone can with certainty be ranked as 

 a moral being, actions of a certain class are called moral, 

 whether performed deliberately after a struggle with 

 opposing motives, or from the effects of slowly-gained 

 habit, or impulsively through instinct. 



But to return to our more immediate subject ; al- 

 though some instincts are more powerful than others, 

 thus leading to corresponding actions, yet it cannot 

 be maintained that the social instincts are ordinarily 

 stronger in man, or have become stronger through 

 long-continued habit, than the instincts, for instance, 

 of self-preservation, hunger, lust, vengeance, &c. Why 

 then does man regret, even though he may endeavour 

 to banish any such regret, that he has followed the 

 one natural impulse, rather than the other; and why 

 does he further feel that he ought to regret his conduct ? 

 Man in this respect differs profoundly from the lower 

 animals. Nevertheless we can, I think, see with some 

 degree of clearness the reason of this difference. 



Man, from the activity of his mental faculties, cannot 

 avoid reflection : past impressions and images are in- 

 cessantly passing through his mind with distinctness. 

 Now with those animals which live permanently in a 

 body, the social instincts are ever present and per- 

 sistent. Such animals are always ready to utter the 

 danger-signal, to defend the community, and to give 

 aid to their fellows in accordance with their habits; 

 they feel at all times, without the stimulus of any 

 special passion or desire, some degree of love and 

 sympathy for them ; they are unhappy if long separated 

 from them, and always happy to be in their company. 

 So it is with ourselves. A man who possessed no trace 



