Chap. III. MORAL SENSE. 93 



with his social instincts, that is with the good of others ; 

 but in order to be quite free from self-reproach, or at 

 least of anxiety, it is almost necessary for him to avoid 

 the disapprobation, whether reasonable or not, of his 

 fellow men. Nor must he break through the fixed habits 

 of his life, especially if these are supported by reason ; 

 for if he does, he will assuredly feel dissatisfaction. 

 He must likewise avoid the reprobation of the one 

 God or gods, in whom according to his knowledge or 

 superstition he may believe ; but in this case the addi- 

 tional fear of divine punishment often supervenes. 



The strictly Social Virtues at first alone regarded. — 

 The above view of the first origin and nature of the moral 

 sense, which tells us what we ought to do, and of 

 the conscience which reproves us if we disobey it, 

 accords well with what we see of the early and un- 

 developed condition of this faculty in mankind. The 

 virtues which must be practised, at least generally, by 

 rude men, so that they may associate in a body, are 

 those which are still recognised as the most important. 

 But they are practised almost exclusively in relation to 

 the men of the same tribe ; and their opposites are not 

 regarded as crimes in relation to the men of other tribes. 

 No tribe could hold together if murder, robbery, trea- 

 chery, &c, were common ; consequently such crimes 

 within the limits of the same tribe "are branded 

 " with everlasting infamy ; " ffl but excite no such senti- 

 ment beyond these limits. A North-American Indian 

 is well pleased with himself, and is honoured by others, 

 when he scalps a man of another tribe ; and a Dyak 



23 Sec an able article in the ' North British Review,' 1867, p. 395. 

 See also Mr. W. Bagehot's articles on the Importance of Obedience 

 and Coherence to Primitive Man, in the ' Fortnightly Review,' 1867, 

 p. 529, and 1868, p. 457, &c. 



