98 THE DESCENT OF MAN. Part I- 



fundamentally identical with the social instincts; and 

 in the case of the lower animals it would be absurd to 

 speak of these instincts as having been developed from 

 selfishness, or for the happiness of the community. 

 They have, however, certainly been developed for the 

 general good of the community. The term, general 

 good, may be defined as the means by which the great- 

 est possible number of individuals can be reared in 

 full vigour and. health, with all their faculties perfect, 

 under the conditions to which they are exposed. As 

 the social instincts both of man and the lower animals 

 have no doubt been developed by the same steps, it 

 would be advisable, if found practicable, to use the 

 same definition in both cases, and to take as the test 

 of morality, the general good or welfare of the com- 

 munity, rather than the general happiness ; but this 

 definition would perhaps require some limitation on 

 account of political ethics. 



When a man risks his life to save that of a fellow- 

 creature, it seems more appropriate to say that he acts 

 for the general good or welfare, rather than for the 

 general happiness of mankind. No doubt the welfare 

 and the happiness of the individual usually coincide ; 

 and a contented, happy tribe will flourish better than 

 one that is discontented and unhappy. We have seen 

 that at an early period in the history of man, the ex- 

 pressed wishes of the community will have naturally 

 influenced to a large extent the conduct of each mem- 

 ber ; and as all wish for happiness, the " greatest happi- 

 ness principle" will have become a most important 

 secondary guide and object ; the social instincts, includ- 

 ing sympathy, always serving as the primary impulse 

 and guide. Thus the reproach of laying the foundation 

 of the most noble part of our nature in the base prin- 

 ciple of selfishness is removed ; unless indeed the satis- 



