100 THE DESCENT OF MAN. Part I. 



quarters of the world, so deeply impressed on the mind 

 of men ; but it is worthy of remark that a belief con- 

 stantly inculcated during the early years of life, whilst 

 the brain is impressible, appears to acquire almost the 

 nature of an instinct ; and the very essence of an in- 

 stinct is that it is followed independently of reason. 

 Neither can Ave say why certain admirable virtues, such 

 as the love of truth, are much more highly appre- 

 ciated by some savage tribes than by others ; ^ nor, 

 again, why similar differences prevail even amongst 

 civilised nations. Knowing how firmly fixed many 

 strange customs and superstitions have become, we 

 need feel no surprise that the self-regarding virtues 

 should now appear to us so natural, supported as they 

 are by reason, as to be thought innate, although they 

 were not valued by man in his early condition. 



Notwithstanding many sources of doubt, man can 

 generally and readily distinguish between the higher 

 and lower moral rules. The higher are founded on the 

 social instincts, and relate to the welfare of others. 

 They are supported by the approbation of our fellow- 

 men and by reason. The lower rules, though some of 

 them when implying self-sacrifice hardly deserve to be 

 called lower, relate chiefly to self, and' owe their origin 

 to public opinion, when matured by experience and 

 cultivated ; for they are not practised by rude tribes. 



As man advances in civilisation, and small tribes 

 are united into larger communities, the simplest reason 

 would tell each individual that he ought to extend his 

 social instincts and sympathies to all the members of 

 the same nation, though personally unknown to him. 

 This point being once reached, there is only an arti- 



83 Good instances are given by Mr. Wallace in ' Scientific Opinion,' 

 Sept. 15, 1869 ; and more fully in his ' Contributions to the Theory of 

 Natural Selection,' 1S70, p. 353. 



