104 THE DESCENT OF MAN. Part I. 



between the various instincts of the lower animals, it is 

 not surprising that there should be a struggle in man 

 between his social instincts, with their derived virtues, 

 and his lower, though at the moment, stronger impulses 

 or desires. This, as Mr. Galton 38 has remarked, is all 

 the less surprising, as man has emerged from a state of 

 barbarism within a comparatively recent period. After 

 having yielded to some temptation we feel a sense of 

 dissatisfaction, analogous to that felt from other un- 

 satisfied instincts, called in this case conscience ; for we 

 cannot prevent past images and impressions continually 

 passing through our minds, and these in their weakened 

 state we compare with the ever-present social instincts, 

 or with habits gained in early youth and strengthened 

 during our whole lives, perhaps inherited, so that they 

 are at last rendered almost as strong as instincts. 

 Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear 

 that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we may 

 expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming 

 perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle 

 between our higher and lower impulses will be less 

 severe, and virtue will be triumphant. 



Summary of the two last Chapters. — There can be no 

 doubt that the difference between the mind of the lowest 

 man and that of the highest animal is immense. An 

 anthropomorphous ape, if he could take a dispassionate 

 view of his own case, would admit that though he could 

 form an artful plan to plunder a garden — though he 

 could use stones for fighting or for breaking open nuts, 



effect. Mr. Lecky (' Hist, of Morals,' vol. i. p. 143) seems to a certain 

 extent to coincide. 



38 See his remarkable work on ' Hereditary Genius,' 1SG9, p. 349. 

 The Duke of Argyll ('Primeval Man,' 1869, p. 188) lias some good 

 remarks on the contest in man's nature between right and wrong. 



