164 THE DESCENT OF MAN. Part I. 



first impulse to benevolent actions. Habits, moreover, 

 followed during many generations probably tend to be 

 inherited. 



But there is another and much more powerful sti- 

 mulus to the development of the social virtues, namely, 

 the praise and the blame of our fellow-men. The love 

 of approbation and the dread of infamy, as well as the 

 bestowal of praise or blame, are primarily clue, as Ave 

 have seen in the third chapter, to the instinct of sym- 

 pathy; and this instinct no doubt was originally acquired, 

 like all the other social instincts, through natural selec- 

 tion. At how early a period the progenitors of man, in 

 the course of their development, became capable of feel- 

 ing and being impelled by the praise or blame of their 

 fellow-creatures, we cannot, of course, say. But it appears 

 that even dogs appreciate encouragement, praise, and 

 blame. The rudest savages feel the sentiment of glory, 

 as they clearly show by preserving the trophies of their 

 prowess, by their habit of excessive boasting, and even 

 by the extreme care which they take of their personal 

 appearance and decorations ; for unless they regarded 

 the opinion of their comrades, such habits would be 

 senseless. 



Thev certainlv feel shame at the breach of some of 

 their lesser rules ; but how far they experience remorse 

 is doubtful. I was at first surprised that I could not re- 

 collect any recorded instances of this feeling in savages ; 

 and Sir J. Lubbock 6 states that he knows of none. 

 But if we banish from our minds all cases given in 

 novels and plays and in death-bed confessions made 

 to priests, I doubt whether many of us have actually 

 witnessed remorse; though we may have often seen 

 shame and contrition for smaller offences. Remorse is 



' Origin of Civilisation,' 1870, p. 265. 



