Chap III., MORAL SENSE CI 



CHAPTER III. 



COMPAKISON OF THE MENTAL TOWERS OF MAN AND THE 



lower animals — continued. 



The Moral Sense. — Fundamental Proposition. — The Qualities of Social 

 • Animals. — Origin of Sociability. — Struggle between Opposed In- 

 stincts. — Man a Social Animal. — The more enduring Social Instincts 

 conquer other less Persistent Instincts. — The Social Virtues alone re- 

 garded by Savages. — Tho Self-regarding Virtues acquired at a Later 

 Stage of Development. — The Importance of the Judgment of the 

 Members of the same Community on Conduct. — Transmission of 

 Moral Tendencies. — Summary. 



I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers * 

 who maintain that, of all the differences between man and 

 the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far 

 the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh 2 remarks, 

 " has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of 

 human action ; " it is summed up in that short but impe- 

 rious word ought, so full of high significance. It is the 

 most noble of all the attributes of man, leading him with- 

 out a moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a fel- 

 low-creature ; or after due deliberation, impelled simply 

 by the deep feeling of right or duty,- to sacrifice it in some 

 great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, " Duty ! Won- 

 drous thought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, 



1 See, for instance, on this subject, Quatrefages, 'Unite de l'Espece 

 Himaine,' 1861, p. 21, etc. 



* 'Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy,' 183Y, p. 231, etc. 



