100 THE DESCENT OF MAN. [Part L 



prising, as •man has emerged from a state of barbarism 

 within a comparatively recent period. After having 

 yielded to some temptation, we feel a sense of dissatisfac- 

 tion, analogous to that felt from other unsatisfied instincts, 

 called in this case conscience ; for we cannot prevent past 

 images and impressions continually passing through our 

 minds, and these in their weakened state we compare with 

 the ever-present social instincts, or with habits gained in 

 early youth and strengthened during our whole lives, per- 

 haps inherited, so that they are at last rendered almost as 

 strong as instincts. Looking to future generations, there 

 is no cause to fear that the social instincts will grow 

 weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits will grow 

 stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this 

 case the struggle between our higher and lower impulses 

 will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant. 



Summary of the last two Chapters. — There can be no 

 doubt that the difference between the mind of the lowest 

 man and that of the* highest animal is immense. An an- 

 thropomorphous ape, if he could take a dispassionate view 

 of his own case, would admit that though he could form 

 an artful plan to plunder a garden — -though he could use 

 stones for fighting or for breaking open nuts, yet that the 

 thought of fashioning a stone into a tool was quite beyond 

 his scope. Still less, as he would admit, could he follow 

 out a train of metaphysical reasoning, or solve a mathe- 

 matical problem, or reflect on God, or admire a grand 

 natural scene. Some apes, however, would probably de- 

 clare that they could and did admire the beauty of the col- 

 ored skin and fur of their partners in marriage. They 

 would admit, that though they could make other apes 

 understand by cries some of their perceptions and simpler 



The Duke of Argyll ('Primeval Man,' 1869, p. 188) has some good re- 

 marks on the contest in man's nature between right and wrong. 



