9 S CLASSES OF IDEAS. Sect. XV. i. 4. 



called complex ideas, as when you recollect Weftminfter Ab- 

 bey, or the planet Saturn : but it muft be obferved, that thefe 

 complex ideas, thus re-excited by volition, fenfation, or affocia- 

 tion, are feldom perfect copies of their correfpondent percep- 

 tions, except in our dreams, where other external objects do not 

 detract our attention. 



4. Thofe ideas, which are more complex than the natural ob- 

 jects that iirft excited them, have been called compounded ideas, 

 as when we think of a fphinx, cr griffin. 



5. And thofe that are lefs complex than the correfpondent 

 natural objects, have been termed abftracled ideas : thus fweet- 

 nefs, and whitened, and folidity, are received at the fame time 

 from a lump of fugar, yet I can recollect any of thefe qualities 

 without thinking of the others, that were excited along with 

 them. See Sect. XVI. 1 7. 



When ideas are fo far abftracted as in the above example, 

 they have been termed fimple by the writers of metaphyfics, and 

 feem indeed to be more complete repetitions of the ideas or fen- 

 fual motions, originally excited by external objects. 



Other claiTes of thefe ideas, where the abftraction has not been 

 fo great, have been termed, by Mr. Locke, modes, fubftances, 

 and relations, but they feem only to differ in their degree of ab- 

 itraction from the complex ideas that were at firft excited ; for 

 as thefe complex or natural ideas are themfelves imperfect copies 

 of their correfpondent perceptions, fo thefe abftract or general 

 ideas are only (till more imperfect copies of the fame percep- 

 tions. Thus when I have feen an object but once, as a rhinoce- 

 ros, my abitract idea of this animal is the fame as my complex 

 one. I may think more or lefs diflinctly of a rhinoceros, but it 

 is the very rhinoceros that I faw, or fome part or property of 

 him, which recurs to my mind. 



But when any clafs of complex objects becomes the fubject of 

 converfation, of which I have icen many individuals, as a caftle 

 or an army, fome property or circumftance belonging to it is 

 peculiarly alluded to ; and then I feel in my own mind, that my 

 abitract idea of this complex object is only an idea of that part, 

 property, or attitude of it, that employs the prefent converfation, 

 and varies v/ith every ferrtence that is fpoken concerning it. So 

 if any one mould fay, " one may fit upon a horfe fafer than on 

 a camel," my abstract idea of the two animals includes only an 

 outline of the level back of the one, and the gibbofity on the 

 back of the other. What noifc is that in the ftreet ? — J 

 horfes trotting over the pavement. Her? my idea of the horl 

 includes principally the mape and motion of their legs. 

 alfo • ore im- 



C '"V 



