Sect. XV. 3.4. CLASSES OF IDEAS. 99 



voluntarily continue to excite one train of ideas, fuppofe the de- 

 fign of railing water by a machine 5 and at the fame time attend 

 to all other ideas, which are connected with this by every kind 

 of catenation ; and combine or feparate them voluntarily for the 

 purpofe of obtaining fome end. 



For we can create nothing new, we can only combine or fepa- 

 rate the ideas, which we have already received by our percep- 

 tions : thus if I wilh to reprefent a monfter, I call to my mind 

 the ideas of every thing difagreeable and horrible, and combine 

 the naftinefs and gluttony of a hog, the ftupidity and obftinacy 

 of an afs, with the fur and awkwardnefs of a bear, and call the 

 new combination Caliban. Yet fuch a monfter may exifl in 

 nature, as all his attributes are parts of nature. So when I wim 

 to reprefent every thing, that is excellent and amiable ; when I 

 combine benevolence with cheerfulnefs, wifdom, knowledge, 

 tafte, wit, beauty of perfon, and elegance of manners, and ailb- 

 ciate them in one lady as a pattern to the world, it is called in- 

 vention j yet fuch a perfon may exift, — fuch a perfon does ex- 

 ift ! — It is — , who is as much a monfter as Caliban. 



4. In refpecl: to confeioufnefs, we are only confeious of our 

 exiftence, when we think about it ; as we only perceive the 

 lapfe of time, when we attend to it ; when we are bufied about 

 other objects, neither the lapfe of time nor the confeioufnefs of 

 our own exiftence can occupy our attention. Hence, when we 

 think of our own exiftence, we only excite abftracted or reflex 

 ideas (as they are termed), of our principal pleafures or pains, of 

 our defires or averfions, or of the figure, folidity, colour, or 

 other properties of our bodies, and call that acl: of the fenfori- 

 ura a* confeioufnefs of our exiftence. Some philofophers, I be- 

 lieve it is Des Cartes, has faid, « I think, therefore I exift. " 

 But this is not right reafoning, becaufe thinking is a mode of 

 exiftence ; and it is thence only faying, " I exift, therefore I 

 exift." For there are three modes of exiftence, or in the lan- 

 guage of grammarians three kinds of verbs. Firft, fimpiy I am, 

 or exift. Secondly, I am a&ing, or exift in a ftate of activity, 

 as I move. Thirdly, I am fuffering, or exift in a ftate of being 

 a£ted upon, as I am moved. The when, and the where, as ap- 

 plicable to this exiftence, depends on the fucceflive motions of 

 our own or of other bodies ; and on their refpective fituations, 

 as fpoken of, Seel. XIV. 2.5. 



5. Our identity is known by our acquired habits or catenated 

 trains of ideas and mufcular motions ; and perhaps, when we 

 compare infancy with old age, in thofe alone can. our identity be 

 fuppofed to exift. For what elfe is there of fimilitude between 

 the firft fpeck of living entity and the mature man . p — every de- 



dudliort 



