}co CLASSES OF IDEAS. Sect. XV s . 3. 6, 



fluction of reafoning, every fentiment or paflion, with eVery fibre 

 of the corporeal part of our fyftem, has been fubjecl: almoit to 

 annual mutation ; while fome catenations alone of our ideas and 

 mufcular actions have continued in part unchanged. 



By the facility, with which we can in our waking hours vol- 

 untarily produce certain fucceflive trains of ideas, we know by 

 experience, that we have before reproduced them ; that is, we 

 are conlcious of a time of our exiftence previous to the prefent 

 rime -, that is, of our identity now and heretofore. It is thefe 

 habits oi action, thefe catenations of ideas and mufcular mo- 

 $ion$, which begin with life, and only terminate with it ; and 

 which we can in fome meafure deliver to our pollerity ; as ex- 

 plained in Sc£t. XXXIX. 



6. When the progreflive motions of external bodies make a 

 part of ou r prefen: catenation of ideas, we attend to the lapfeof 

 tiiiie ; which appears the longer, the more frequently we thus 

 attend to it ; as when we expect fomething at a certain hour, 

 which much interefts us, whether it be an agreeable or difagree- 

 able event -, cr when we count the paffing feconds oh a ftop- 

 watch. 



When an idea of our own perfon, or a reflex idea of our 

 pleufurec and pains, defires and averfions, makes a part of this 

 catenation, it is termed confcioufnefs ; and if this idea of con. 

 fcioufnefs makes a part of a catenation, which we excite by rec- 

 ollection, and know by the facility with which we excite it, that 

 we have before experienced it, it is called identity, as explained 

 above, 



7. In refpect to freewill, it is certain, that we cannot will to 

 think of a new train of ideas, without previoufly thinking of the 

 iirfl: link of it ; as I cannot will to think of a black fwan, with- 

 out previoufly thinking of a black fwan. But if I now think of 

 a tail, I can voluntarily recollect all animals, which have tails j 

 my will is fo far free, that I can purfue the ideas linked to this 

 idea of tail, as far as my knowledge of the fubjecl: extends •, but 

 to will without motive is to will without defire or averfion ; 

 which is as abfurd as to feel without pleafure or pain ; they are 

 both folecifms in the terms. So far are we governed by the 

 catenations of motions, which affect: both the body and the mind 

 of man^ and which begin with our irritability, and end with it. 



SECT. 



