Sect. XXXIV. i. i. OF VOLITION. 325 



the mufcular fibres, or of the organs of fenfe, it is termed voli- 

 tion ; and the actions produced in confequence are termed vol- 

 untary actions. Whence it appears, that motions of our muf- 

 cles or ideas may be produced in confequence of defire or aver- 

 fion without our having the power £0 prevent them, and yet thefe 

 motions may be termed voluntary, according to our definition of 

 the word ; though in common language they would be called 

 involuntary. 



The objects of defire and averfion are generally at a diftance, 

 whereas thofe of pleafure and pain are immediately acting upon 

 our organs. Hence, before defire or averfion is exerted, fo as 

 to caufe any actions, there is generally time for deliberation ; 

 which confilts in difcovering the means to obtain the object of 

 delire, or to avoid the object of averfion ; or in examining the 

 good or bad confequences, which may refult from them. In 

 this cafe it is evident, that we have a power to delay the pro- 

 pofed action, or to perform it ; and this power of choofing, 

 whether we (hall act or not, is in common language exprefled 

 by the word volition, or will. Whereas in this work the word 

 volition means fimply the active date of the fenforial faculty in 

 producing motion in confequence of defire or averfion : whether 

 we have the power of retraining that action, or not •, that is, 

 whether we exert any actions in confequence of oppoiite defires 

 or averfions or not. 



For if the objects of defire or averfion are prefent, there is no 

 neceffity to inveftigate or compare the means of obtaining them, 

 nor do we always deliberate about their confequences ; that is, 

 no deliberation neceflarily intervenes, and in confequence the 

 power of choofing to act or not is not exerted. It is probable, 

 that this two-fold ufe of the word volition in all languages has 

 confounded the metaphyficians, who have difputed about free 

 will and neceflity. Whereas from the above analyfis it would 

 appear, that during our fleep, we ufe no voluntary exertions at 

 all ; and in our waking hours, that they are the confequence of 

 defire or averfion. 



To will is to act in confequence of defire •, but to defire 

 means to defire fomething, even if that fomething be only to be- 

 come free from the pain, which caufes the defire ; for to defire 

 nothing is not to defire ; the word defire, therefore, includes 

 both the action and the object or motive *, for the object and 

 motive of defire are the fame thing. Hence to defire without an 

 object, that is, without a motive, is a folecifm in language. As 

 if one fhould aflc, if you could eat without food, or breathe 

 without air. 



From this account of volition it appears, that convulfions of 



the 



