374 GENERAL SUMMARY [Pabt II 



and excites trains of thought which would never arise 

 from the mere impression of the senses, and if they did 

 arise could not be followed out. The higher intellectual 

 powers of man, such as those of ratiocination, abstraction, 

 self-consciousness, etc., will have followed from the con- 

 tinued improvement of other mental faculties ; but with- 

 out considerable culture of the mind, both in the race and 

 in the individual, it is doubtful whether these high powers 

 would be exercised, and thus fully attained. 



The development of the moral qualities is a more in- 

 teresting and difficult problem. Their foundation lies in 

 the social instincts, including in this term the family ties. 

 These instincts are of a highly-complex nature, and in the 

 case of the lower animals give special tendencies toward 

 certain definite actions ; but the more important elements 

 for us are love, and the distinct emotion of sympathy. 

 Animals endowed with the social instincts take pleasure 

 in each other's company, warn each other of danger, de- 

 fend and aid each other in many ways. These instincts 

 are not extended to all the individuals of the species, but 

 only to those of the same community. As they are high- 

 ly beneficial to the species, they have in all probability 

 been acquired through natural selection. 



A moral being is one. who is capable of comparing his 

 past and future actions and motives — of approving of 

 some and disapproving of others ; and the fact that man 

 is the one being who with certainty can be thus desig- 

 nated makes the greatest of all distinctions between him 

 and the lower animals. But in our third chapter I have 

 endeavored to show that the moral sense follows, firstly, 

 from the enduring and always present nature of the 

 social instincts, in which respect man agrees with the 

 lower animals ; and secondly, from his mental faculties 

 being highly active and his impressions of past events 

 extremely vivid, in which respects he differs from the 



