No.i.] PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINING IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY. 99 



under the direction of, or in cooperation with, neuro-psychiatrists. In many quarters it was 

 thought that the psychologist was a medical specialist who was responsible for work that neuro- 

 psychiatrists should do. This serious misconception led to complications which lessened the 

 value of psychological examining and constituted the chief basis for some of the disapprovals 

 which most nearly wrecked the Division of Psychology. Had psychologists been called personnel 

 officers and had their work been designated as testing mental alertness, this unfortunate confu- 

 sion would have been avoided and along with it many misconceptions which still persist in the 

 Army. 



(n) Popular misunderstanding concerning materials and methods worked to the dis- 

 advantage of the service through political and other channels. To the person unfamiliar with 

 such matters, the tests appeared trivial, absurd or unfair. Many people considered it a bad joke 

 to have psychologists conducting examinations by such means in the Army. Some even 

 suspected that the work was being done for scientific purposes merely and against, rather than 

 for, military efficiency. Often the work was wrongly described as investigation or research, 

 instead of as service. These misunderstandings and misinterpretations of method reached even 

 the offices of the Secretary of War and of the General Staff. Some of them undoubtedly had 

 to do with the initiation of special investigations into the conduct and value of the service. 



(o) Following upon such misunderstandings and misconceptions as have been mentioned, 

 the official investigations created reasonable doubt concerning the permanency of psychological 

 examining. This doubt extended even to the camps and there served to increase the difficulties 

 and discomforts of psychological staffs. It was reported in certain quarters that psychological 

 examining had been discredited by reports of official investigation, that the work lacked the sup- 

 port of the General Staff and would shortly be abandoned. It is not difficult to imagine how 

 such rumors interfered with the progress of the service and tended to reduce its practical value. 



Although this is only a partial list of disadvantages, it would appear like overhigh praise of 

 the success of psychological examining to extend it or to attempt to emphasize more strongly 

 adverse as contrasted with favorable conditions of work. As a matter of fact, the conditions 

 which have been listed as unfavorable may have done much to stimulate the psychological 

 personnel and to develop a fighting spirit which refused to admit even the possibility of failure. 



Section 3. — Summary of examining. 



The achievements of the psychological service between September, 1917, and January, 

 1919, may at this point be summarized very briefly, since this memoir presents a detailed 

 account of the work with reference especially to organization, methods and practical results. 



After preliminary trial in four cantonments psychological examining was extended by the 

 War Department to the entire Army, excepting only field and general officers. To supply the 

 requisite personnel, a school for training in military psychology was established in the Medical 

 Officers' Training Camp, Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. Approximately 100 officers and more than 

 300 enlisted men received training at this school. 



The work of mental examining was organized finally in 35 army training camps. A grand 

 total of 1,726,966 men had been given psychological examination prior to January 31, 1919. 

 Of this number about 42,000 were commissioned officers. More than 83,500 of the enlisted 

 men included in the total had been given individual examination in addition to the group 

 examination for literates, for illiterates, or both. 



Between April 28, 1918, and January 31, 1919, 7,800 men (0.5 per cent) were reported with 

 recommendations for discharge by psychological examiners because of mental inferiority. The 

 recommendations for assignment to labor battalions because of low grade intelligence number 

 10,014 (0.6+ per cent). For assignment to development battalions, in order that they might 

 be more carefully observed and given preliminary training to discover, if possible, ways of using 

 them in the Army, 9,487 men (0.6+ per cent) were recommended. 



During this same interval there were reported 4,780 men with mental age below 7 years; 

 7,875, between 7 and 8 years; 14,814, between S and 9 years; 18,878, between 9 and 10 years. 



