482 MEMOIRS NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. [v OL .xv. 



certain number of men. From 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the high-grade men, as recognized 

 by their own officers, could be positively identified by psychological examiners on the basis of 

 scores in examination a. 



The advertising value of the results thus obtained served primarily to give the psychological 

 staffs confidence in their work. The amount of skepticism among psychologists was if anything 

 greater than that exhibited by persons only slightly familiar with such work. The striking 

 evidence from the results in the early examining was proof that the percentage of high grade 

 men needed for company organizations could readily be selected by this means. It became 

 evident that when the examiners gave the tests to recruits upon arrival the data would be 

 extremely valuable in the preliminary selection of noncom mi ssioned officers. The reports of 

 company commanders on the value of psychological scores for their use, requested by the Gen- 

 eral Staff at the close of the fall work, indicate again and again that they could have made 

 extremely valuable use of scores in the initial organization of their companies. 



Examination a therefore produced immediate results. Its success, as indicated above, 

 assured the acceptance of psychological examining so far as the merits of the proposition were 

 concerned. Numerous specific objections were raised. Many of these have been discussed. 

 They may be classified as administrative difficulties, criticisms aimed at validity of results or 

 usefulness of results where considered valid, and technical criticisms of the tests themselves. 

 The first two types of criticism were important in view of the speed required in the organization 

 and training of divisions. Repetition of argument and even of demonstration were necessary 

 to prove that 1,000 to 1,500 men could be put through the tests in the morning of a single day 

 and returned in time for their afternoon drill. In the end the details of administration which so 

 often threatened to disrupt examining and to cause its forcible ejection or to bring it at least into 

 permanent disrepute were reduced to smoothly working plans. 



Among the objections raised it was argued that, even though the results were correct and 

 gave evidence concerning the military value of men, this information should be obtained by the 

 company officers through contact with their men. The results could become actually harmful 

 if they prevented the close acquaintance of officers with their men. Such information had been 

 obtained by the officers, as shown by the close correspondence of results of the examination and 

 officers' estimates of their men. It was, therefore, obtainable in usual ways, hence there was no 

 necessity of burdening the Army with this additional cost in time, money, and extra officers 

 and men to do the examining. The importance of such arguments is greatest where they refer 

 to small units and small armies with abundance of opportunity and time for organization and 

 training. The arguments retain validity in so far as the final product of nnlitary efficiency is 

 measured by the close cooperation of officers and men. But, however the ultimate result to be 

 attained might be stated, it was apparent that camp examiners were saving time. They were 

 measuring one important quality of a soldier. Several others remained to be estimated and made 

 common knowledge. Much important work remained before company officers would properly 

 know their men. Armies were to be organized and it was necessary to know where exceptional 

 ability could be found when needed. It was quickly shown by psychological scores that such 

 ability was not evenly distributed. Extremely weak links in companies, in regiments, and in 

 divisions were discovered by the examiners. Two regiments differed widely in mental strength 

 within a single division. Psychological exaniining could point out weaknesses that extended to 

 differences between divisions. It not merely pointed them out but indicated the specific cause 

 where that was due to low intelligence. Numerous evidences of these inequalities are given in 

 chapter 14. 



The technical criticisms of the tests and personal objections of subjects have been discussed 

 in the earl}' chapters of this volume. A few may be noticed at this point, however. The mental 

 grip of many subjects seemed weak to them; they felt unable to indicate their real ability and 

 believed that practice woidd increase their available mental power. This feeling produced two 

 criticisms — one that many officers and men had not been working at such operations as the tests 

 covered and the tests did not therefore adequately measure their practiced abilities; the other 

 that the time was so short for each sort of test that the subject was only fairly into the spirit 



