LOGIC: A REJOINDER TO MISS STEBBING 23 



enough of the crew left to man all the other boats, so that the 

 two terms in the premisses do not together distribute the term 

 used in the conclusion. But if they did, the rule of logic would 

 still be broken, for it says that a term must not be distributed in 

 the conclusion unless it is distributed in one of the premisses, 

 and the whole of the crew is not referred to in either of the 

 premisses any more than it is in both taken together. 



It would be easy to show that in the other instances Miss 

 Stebbing's criticisms are equally invalid, but it would be tedious 

 to do so, and I pass on to her general argument. She points 

 out my two gravest mistakes: (1) I assume that the traditional 

 syllogistic rules are intended to apply to all possible reasonings, 

 and (2) I consider that the middle term is not essential for valid 

 inductive reasoning. 



With respect to (1), I trust I make no assumption without 

 sufficient grounds. I have shown at the opening of this rejoinder 

 the importance attached by logicians to the syllogism in com- 

 parison with other modes of mediate inference. If we may take 

 the space allotted to them respectively as an indication of their 

 relative importance, the syllogism ranks as 460, and all the other 

 modes of reasoning put together as 6. Even Miss Stebbing 

 herself, though she gives away the syllogism with one hand, by 

 admitting that it is not the exclusive form of reasoning, immedi- 

 ately takes it back with the other by saying that it is coextensive 

 with every form of argument; and she goes on to say that 

 however complicated the reasoning may be it can always be 

 broken up into a series of syllogisms ; and this is the contention 

 of every logician. I am quite content with these admissions. 

 No one with any experience of logicians expects them to be 

 consistent, and if they like to say that the syllogism is not the 

 exclusive form of reasoning, but that it is the form in which all 

 reasoning can be cast, and must be cast if it is to be tested, I 

 know no way of preventing them. 



My second mistake, so Miss Stebbing says, is much more 

 serious; and then she proceeds to read me the usual lesson that 

 has been read to me so many times by so many different logicians, 

 upon the necessity of a middle term, and upon " the well-known 

 general principle " that all reasoning consists in the application 

 of general rules to particular cases. Every logician finds it 

 incumbent on him or her to read me this lesson, and to do so in 

 much the same manner as a senior wrangler might teach the 



