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other hand, the difficulty of supposing that the consciousness 

 of all minds living contemporaneously occupies the same in- 

 definitely thin time of one dimension is one which it is im- 

 possible to exaggerate. 



4. Finally, there is no doubt that the theory which I have 

 advanced acts like magic in solving metaphysical difficulties ; 

 the interaction of mind and matter, the origin of consciousness 

 in time, the substance of matter, what was originally a system 

 of causes and effects only having suddenly introduced into it 

 an entirely different system of purposes and ends, and several 

 other difficulties, all easily yielding to this solvent. If all 

 these difficulties are met by simply supposing that the spatial 

 relations of bodies have undergone distortion as well as the 

 secondary qualities of bodies, time-relations being converted 

 into unreal space-relations, is this not a sufficient reason for 

 adopting the view, especially as it is difficult to believe that 

 space-relations have not undergone distortion in the process 

 leading to perception, seeing that the secondary qualities of 

 bodies are known to have undergone very great distortion in 

 the same process ? 



I may say that the theory is not encumbered with the 

 incredible Occasionalism which killed Berkeley's Idealistic 

 theory. 



With regard to the criticism of the expression " parts of 

 minds," I admit that I ought to have been more explicit. I 

 meant the subordinate, sub-subordinate, etc., minds of which, 

 according to my theory, all minds are constituted. 



Yours faithfully, 



Leonard Hall. 



