ESSAY-REVIEWS 611 



savage warms his courage and secures vigour for battle by a 

 war-dance. The dance passes into the higher regions of art — 

 a utility becomes a purely aesthetic enjoyment. Utility is 

 concerned in the genesis of aesthetic interest ; this is enough to 

 preclude the summary rejection of natural selection in favour 

 of a special design for our aesthetic benefit. 



For the purposes of his argument, Mr. Balfour describes 

 " objects of aesthetic interest " as applying to the " most varying 

 degrees of excellence — to the small as well as to the great. ..." 

 The aesthetic values depend on the " intrinsic quality of the 

 emotions " aroused and not on ulterior purposes. Those of the 

 highest grade compel us, according to the line of argument just 

 indicated, to accept the Theistic alternative. He similarly 

 extends ethics to embrace " the whole range of what used to be 

 called ' springs of action ' from the loftiest love " to the most 

 lowly impulses, and he similarly restricts his argument for 

 Theism based on ethical considerations to the highest moral 

 grades. He conceives morals as concerned with ends of action, 

 and principally with ultimate ends of action. This differentiates 

 the ethical from the aesthetic without, however, destroying the 

 essential parallelism between the two lines of argument. 



Altruistic efforts on the lower portions of the ethical scale, 

 such as the parental devotion among animals, have survival 

 value and compel no appeal from selection to Theism. The 

 higher parts of the scale find their only explanation in the 

 latter. The argument does not gain in cogency by its transfer- 

 ence to the ethical plane. 



Among animals, we learn, there is no contrasting of " alter- 

 native ends." " In the bee-hive altruism is obeyed, but not 

 chosen." There are many ultimate ends for man that may 

 harmonise or clash. It seems rather curious to imply that the 

 clashing or chaotic element should point to a divine regime. 

 The human " ethics of reflection " are also contrasted with the 

 " ethics of instinct " with respect to plasticity. " Instincts 

 are (relatively) definite and stable," animal loyalties do not 

 become nuclei of wider associations. Human loyalties show 

 no similar fixity. Since, however, the capacity for altruistic 

 emotions and beliefs is useful to the race it may be plausibly con- 

 jectured that it is a direct product of organic evolution, just as 

 animal loyalties may be. But the highest altruistic ideals 



