610 SCIENCE PROGRESS 



from divine intention we must persist in refusing to admit this 

 separation. It is quite possible that loss of aesthetic values 

 might form part price of rational insight. Such a supposition 

 is, however, unnecessary. Why should we cease to appreciate 

 Homer because we discover that there was no providential 

 design in our possession of such appreciation ? Little wonder 

 Mr. Balfour warns us " that the argument from aesthetic values 

 is not a scientific induction or a logical inference." His method 

 is very different indeed from reasoning. He seeks to impress 

 us so much with the value of certain supreme aesthetic interests 

 that we spontaneously accept the suggestion of providential 

 design behind them. This is the role of the hypnotiser. We 

 can understand how aesthetic ecstasy prompts to belief in com- 

 munion with the Divine Spirit without failing to perceive that 

 the belief receives no support from reason. 



Mr. Balfour recognises that the " charm of history essentially 

 depends " on its actuality — " upon its accuracy ; or (more 

 strictly) upon its supposed accuracy." This " supposed ac- 

 curacy " is sufficient then for value to be retained. " It is also 

 true " that we enjoy " nature at first hand, nature seen immedi- 

 ately, if not as she is, at least as she appears." Nature is nature, 

 and our enjoyment and appreciation remain whether we were 

 intended to enjoy or not. 



The supplementary argument that our aesthetic values, 

 particularly our highest aesthetic values, cannot be due to selec- 

 tion and must therefore belong to a design for our benefit too 

 drastically limits the alternatives. By-products are frequently 

 exploited when found to be valuable. ^Esthetic interests may 

 well be by-products (or after-products), that we have learned 

 to esteem, of the evolutionary process. Just as dreams are an 

 incidental consequence of our psychical constitution, so may 

 it be with aesthetic interests. The argument also disposes too 

 simply of one of its own suggested alternatives. ^Esthetic 

 interests expand and heighten the mental powers. Why 

 summarily dismiss these undoubted effects as unoperative on 

 the evolutionary process ? Even if aesthetic interests were con- 

 fined to this (relatively) indirect influence they would not be 

 unavailable for the action of natural selection, to which Mr. 

 Balfour, though in a somewhat extended sense, restricts the 

 naturalistic factors of evolution. But aesthetic interests are 

 also originally and ultimately connected with utility. The 



