258 F. M. GREGG AND C. A. Mrl'HKETERS 



in some fashion until the final presentation was given. This 

 "carrying over" function was probably mediated, not by an 

 image, but by motor attitudes representative of, or associated 

 with the two responses. One can not make positive assertions 

 as to the character of these motor attitudes. One can point 

 out peculiarities of behavior which could well serve such a 

 function. Our animal during the positive series maintained an 

 attitude of tension and excitement, while a degree of relaxation 

 was evident in the negative series. Cole's animals during the 

 positive series remained with forepaws on the card displayer, 

 pawed at the levers and exhibited a state of tension and excite- 

 ment ; with the first presentation of the negative series, they 

 dropped down from the card displayer, maintained an attitude 

 of relaxation and indifference, and casually glanced at the 

 succeeding levers. It is perfectly feasible that two such 

 distinctive motor attitudes might serve as the stimulus or' 

 beginning of subsequent appropriate modes of response. If 

 images were present in our animal they must have been kinaes- 

 thetic, i.e., imaginal attitudes. Conceived in this manner, the 

 probability in favor of sensory attitudes is more convincing. 

 We have described the function of the third lever as one of 

 "release," i.e., we assumed that the first levers determined or 

 initiated the appropriate response, that the conditions of the 

 experiment prevented the immediate completion of the act, and 

 that the final presentation merely released this inhibited move- 

 ment or motor attitude. This conception is supported by the 

 fact that the animals exhibited a pronounced tendency to im- 

 mediate or premature responses, a tendency so strong and 

 impelling that punishment never succeeded in wholly eradicat- 

 ing it. 



The primary concern of this paper, however, is not to estab- 

 lish any positive doctrines. We expressly refrain from assert- 

 ing that raccoons can not and do not possess and utilize images. 

 Our purpose is essentially negative and critical; we desire to 

 demonstrate the inadequacy of Cole's experiment as a conclu- 

 sive and convincing proof of the existence of images. The 

 assumption of higher processes is both unconvincing and futile 

 so long as there exists even the possibility, to say nothing of 

 the probability of an interpretation in terms of lower and more 

 primitive conditions. The existence of images must remain 



