470 EDWIN G. BORING 



instinct and intelligence thus occurring together from the very- 

 first, and being separated only by abstraction. 



The distinction between instinct and intelligence is made 

 more concrete by reference to the nervous processes involved 

 (Chap. III). The author finds three kinds of behavior: (i) the 

 reflex, which is unconscious and is correlated with processes in 

 the spinal cord; (2) instinctive behavior, which involves "suf- 

 fused awareness" and is connected with processes in the sub- 

 cortical centers, and (3) intelligent behavior, which is antici- 

 patory and is confined to cortical processes. He reviews the 

 work of Sherrington, Foster, Schrader, Goltz, and Pagano, and 

 bases his conclusions upon the differences in behavior between 

 normal, decerebrate, and spinal animals. 



In Chapter IV we are told of "innate tendencies" or "inher- 

 ited dispositions," which are due to "congenital connections in 

 cortical centers;" just as instinctive behavior is dependent upon 

 "congenital connections in sub-cortical centeis." There are a 

 large number of innate tendencies, which include inherited 

 capacities for acquirement. The vague "pre-perception," which 

 accompanies the first occurrence of instinctive behavior, is due 

 to an hereditary cortical disposition. 



The next two chapters deal with the nature of experience and 

 its relation to natural history. Experience, both as "that which 

 may be 'experienced and as the process of experiencwg," is held 

 to be everywhere interrelated and to be grounded throughout 

 in nature. The unitariness of all experience is not violated by 

 the appearance of new orders in history, for these, although 

 unpredictable, are merely new syntheses in experience. 



The last chapter is entitled "Finalism and Mechanism." The 

 writer defends mechanism in the sense that all natural processes 

 are determined and can be correlated. He does not hold, how- 

 ever, that any piocess can be expressed in terms of any other 

 process, and distinguishes four principles of interpretation, — 

 mechanical, mechanistic (physical and chemical), organic, and 

 psycho logical. The first two, — possibly the first three, — it may 

 perhaps be possible to merge; the last quite probably must 

 remain distinct. Finalism is accepted only in such cases as 

 involve anticipatory consciousness. 



On the whole, the author has succeeded in giving a clear, if 

 sometimes repetitious, presentation of his own doctrine of "the 



