MORGAN'S "INSTINCT AND EXPERIENCE" 471 



intra-mundane philosophy of experience." One could wish, 

 however, that the presentation were a little less personal, that 

 it contained fewer references to several of the author's asso- 

 ciates, and more references to less immediate philosophical 

 sources. To pass over the doctrines of interactionismandpsycho- 

 phvsical parallelism in half a dozen pages seems hardly fair. 

 One wonders, also, whether a discussion of instinct is the best 

 starting-point for the presentation of a doctrine of experience. 

 The first four chapters might be more intelligible it they fol- 

 lowed the last four; and at best it is a question whether there 

 is any gain in presenting the two topics, instinct and experience, 

 in the same volume. 



In the discussion of instinct, one is prone to question repeat- 

 edly the positive correlation of mental and neural processes. 

 Even granting all the other correlations and the necessity for 

 the "pre-perception " with the first instinctive performance, — a 

 concession which it is not likely that most critics would make, — 

 one is still inclined to wonder in just what way the "pre-percep- 

 tive disposition" is proven to be cortical. And yet it is on this 

 fact that the whole theory of instinct depends. 



