SCIENTIFIC NATIONAL DEFENCE 12; 



troops the better would they stand up under defeat. It was 

 impressed upon him that, with superior numbers and superior 

 efficiency, a nation could make almost certain of winning a war; 

 and he was also told that some German general had written that, 

 as it was impossible to make certain of superior efficiency, it 

 became necessary to aim at superior numbers by training every 

 man in a nation to arms. 



On another occasion the conversation turned on the Russo- 

 Japanese War, and how the Japanese had very cleverly 

 attacked the Russians, without, in the first instance, declaring 

 war, and inflicted what proved to be a wound from which the 

 Russians could never recover. It appeared that the great thing 

 to aim at was to surprise the enemy, and that the most disas- 

 trous form of surprise was that in which a nation was caught 

 napping — that is, unprepared for war — and suddenly attacked. 

 Such an idea seemed to the citizen to be perfectly monstrous ; 

 and, in spite of the illustrations of the Boer and the Russo- 

 Japanese Wars, he refused to believe that nations could act 

 in so dastardly a manner. He recognised, however, that if that 

 form of making war did come into fashion, it would be a poor 

 look-out for a nation which was not perfectly prepared ; and he 

 also recognised that, if a nation refused to act in that fashion, it 

 must endeavour to compensate for its exemplary behaviour by 

 making itself stronger than any possible enemy. He found that 

 a certain pessimism reigned as regards a possible struggle 

 between Great Britain and Germany : simply for this very 

 reason, that it was thought that the Germans, having made their 

 preparations, would attack at their own convenience, suddenly 

 and unexpectedly, when Great Britain was least ready to meet 

 the attack; and that there were no signs that the British people 

 were even aware of such a possibility, or were making any 

 efforts to prepare for it. The citizen was half convinced, the 

 exponents of these views evidently being so very much in 

 earnest; nevertheless, he drew consolation from the fact that, 

 in the Russo-Japanese War, it was the fleet of the island power 

 which had surprised its adversary in so effective a fashion, and 

 if the Japanese fleet could accomplish it, assuredly the British 

 fleet could do likewise. It was pointed out to him, however, 

 that he was optimistic, for that it was not the sailors or the 

 admirals who decided when it was time to attack an enemy, but 

 the statesmen ; and he was asked whether he had sufficient faith 



