SCIENTIFIC NATIONAL DEFENCE 129 



it behoved him to devote the most earnest attention to this 

 problem of the national security. He determined to study the 

 whole matter on strictly scientific, or business, lines. But he 

 found it difficult to commence; the whole business was an 

 unknown quantity to him ; there were no known quantities at 

 all, except these two horrible ideas, of superior force and 

 attacking the enemy when he was unprepared. Where was he 

 to turn to gain knowledge ? 



Though quantities of literature had been produced on the 

 subject, yet such of it as he had read arrived at conclusions 

 which were hopelessly conflicting. Some were in favour of one 

 thing; some in favour of another; some in favour of nothing; 

 but most people were apparently stoutly opposed to the views of 

 everybody else. He began to think that, perhaps, Lord Roberts 

 was not altogether wrong in his strenuous advocacy of national 

 service ; but, on the other hand, " militarism " was said to be 

 (by those who knew what it meant) a fell disease. Besides, it 

 had been said by a member of the Government, a man in whom 

 everybody had the utmost faith, that there were two descriptions 

 of strategy, one which controlled armies in the field and one 

 which constructed them in peace time ; and that Lord Roberts, 

 though a master of the former, was ignorant of the latter. 

 Then there were assertions that the field gun and rifle of the 

 army were not all that could be desired, that the cavalry were 

 short of horses and that the army would be seven thousand short 

 of officers on mobilisation. This seemed a large number. On 

 the other hand, the reassuring official statement had been made 

 that the army was better than it ever had been. That was very 

 consoling. At the same time, one must evidently compare an 

 army, not with what it has been in the past, but with those 

 armies against which it might have to fight in the future. The 

 state of the navy was also disturbing. There were men who 

 could hardly be termed either pessimists or alarmists, who 

 questioned both the efficiency and sufficiency of the navy. 

 It was said that there were not enough cruisers and not enough 

 men to man the navy when mobilised. On the other hand, the 

 citizen had been officially told to sleep peacefully in his bed. 

 But he had already slept for nearly a century on this matter of 

 defence ; surely, it was time to be up and doing. He began to 

 doubt this official optimism. It had been clearly proved, so he 

 understood, that the naval superiority of 160 per cent, over the 



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