5 6o SCIENCE PROGRESS 



important than either" (p. 270). Dr. Schiller's view is that relevance consists in 

 what is selected 'by a knower as helpful for his purpose, and, consequently, purpose 

 and personal psychology are introduced into the very foundation of scientific 

 investigation. By this road an opening is made for the distinctive catchwords of 

 the pragmatist philosophy. All this would have been made so much clearer, in 

 the way Mill so admirably expressed himself, by a few well-chosen examples. It 

 is so easy to infer anything you please so long as you confine discussion merely to 

 general terms. We can only reply in general terms that it is the universal 

 experience of men of science that valid results are only obtainable in so far as 

 personal psychology and special conscious purpose are eliminated from the process 

 of inference. It is probable that Mill would have had little difficulty in disposing 

 of Dr. Schiller's criticisms. There are also a number of points in the chapter on 

 causation which it is not possible to discuss in the space at our disposal. 



Needless to say, there is much cogent criticism in Dr. Schiller's diatribes. 

 The currently taught methodology is certainly somewhat futile from the standpoint 

 of scientific investigation. It is, as the author points out, strangely paradoxical 

 that the theory of science is in Oxford (at London it is admitted as a science 

 subject) taught only to those who know nothing of its practice. But surely not 

 even the current methodology is such as to delay the progress of the science 

 student. Certainly it is far from adequate. But there have been valuable works 

 on the logic of science. Dr. Schiller has forgotten Jevons. 



To turn to the more strictly logical part of the book, it should be remarked that 

 the term logic is commonly used in two senses. It may mean purely formal logic 

 (represented by Jevons and Keynes), it may mean metaphysical logic (represented 

 by Bradley and Bosanquet), which is partly logic, partly methodology, partly meta- 

 physics, and partly, to some extent, psychology. We shall confine ourselves 

 almost entirely to the formal side. That curious medley, metaphysical logic, will, 

 no doubt, in time, sort itself out. Dr. Schiller is entirely antagonistic to both, and 

 his attempt to set the logicians' house in order greatly resembles the Chinese 

 method of burning it down. It will be advisable, therefore, to devote some space 

 to the consideration of one or two fundamentals, the full bearing of which Dr. 

 Schiller seems to have disregarded. 



The first concerns axioms. Reasoning need not be based on axioms, but it 

 often is, and a careful study of their import is essential to any attempt to clarify 

 logic. Dr. Schiller objects to the use of the term a priori. There are, certainly, 

 several senses in which it can be used. But the term, whatever its demerits, does, 

 at least, show the fundamental difference between such truths as the axiom of quantity 

 and the everyday facts of observation and experience. On this matter, Aristotle, 

 Kant, and Spencer, notwithstanding differences, all agree. Dr. Schiller disagrees, or 

 appears to do so. He regards postulation as the source of universal propositions, 

 and makes no clear distinction between the method of arriving at universal truths, 

 in which, no doubt, postulation plays a part, and the certainty which accrues to 

 such truths when enunciated. Dr. Schiller's views on this matter are more fully 

 expressed in Axioms as Postulates} These views I have already criticised at some 

 length, and do not care now to repeat the criticisms. In the volume under review, 

 it is not at all clear whether Dr. Schiller has modified the views he previously 

 expressed. His exposition requires clearer and fuller statement with special 



1 The essay in question is published in a volume entitled Personal Idealism, 

 edited by Mr. Henry Sturt, and published by Macmillan. My criticisms will be 

 found in an article entitled " Evolutionary Empiricism " {Mind, No. 73). 



