REVIEWS 77t 



do it. The methodologists are like the chorus of policemen in the Pirates of 

 Penzance; their song sounds well, but, in the words of Major-General Stanley, 

 they don't go. Prof. Windlebank occupies eleven pages but says little more. 

 He concludes by informing us that " the knowledge of reality of the empirical 

 sciences . . . possesses immanent truth in the agreement of the theory with the 

 facts" (p. 54, italics his). Most of us will be of the opinion that we were aware 

 of this already. 



Prof. Royce makes an attempt to depart from the conventional view that 

 methodology is a division or extension of general or formal logic. He regards 

 formal logic as a very subordinate part of methodology. The idea may be said 

 to be in the air. Dr. Schiller and the pragmatists would certainly not repudiate 

 it. The reviewer expressed a similar but less extreme opinion several years ago. 

 Prof. Royce can thus make no claim to originality in the idea itself. Everything 

 depends on the manner in which he carries it out in detail. A methodology of 

 which formal logic is only a part should, at least, be substantial in its content. 

 It would not be reasonable to expect any considerable detail in Prof. Royce's 

 twenty-seven pages. And such general ideas as he has stated are so condensed 

 in exposition as hardly to admit of summary or criticism. Very great 

 prominence is given to Mr. Charles S. Pierce's logic of induction. He brings 

 into strong relief the presupposition that every set of facts has some definite 

 constitution. " That is, according to our presupposition, there are possible 

 assertions to be made about these facts which are either true or false of each 

 individual fact of the set in question." " ' A is a man ' is either true or is not 

 true of A." On this supposition, which is said not to be self-evident, all induction 

 and scientific inquiry is based. This is interesting and plausible, but what is 

 meant by " fact." A " fact " concerning which nothing could be asserted as true 

 or false would, indeed, be a curious phenomenon. If it is not self-evident that 

 " fact " implies definite constitution, what is self-evident ? There is the usual 

 discussion concerning definition, classification, and stages in the growth of 

 science. The specialist in logic will find the discussion well written, interesting, 

 and highly controversial. It contains just those elements so dear to the formal 

 logician. 



The few methodological pages of M. Couturat contain a glaring example of 

 pyrrhonism. All axioms other than the "common axioms which are the 

 principles of logic " (what are they ?) are merely primary and true for the par- 

 ticular theory under consideration. " We are guided in our choice of fundamental 

 data by quasi-aesthetic reasons." This is pragmatism with a vengeance and, 

 as such, well worth noting. Any one interested must refer to the original for the 

 manner in which it is worked out. 



The whole volume is an admirable compilation in its way and will greatly 

 interest logicians. It is a pity, however, that its object should be stated to be to 

 give expression to the fundamental unity of thought underlying the theoretical 

 and speculative intercourse of civilised peoples. It is merely logical specialism, 

 one more specialised science, added to the rest. 



H. S. Shelton. 



Scientific Method. Its Philosophy and Practice. By F. W. Westaway. 

 [Pp. xx + 439.] (London : Blackie & Son, Ltd., 1912. Price 6s.) 



The volume is divided into four books entitled respectively : The Philosophy of 

 Scientific Method, The Logic of Scientific Method, Famous Men of Science and 

 Their Methods, Scientific Method in the Classroom. 



