ESSAY-REVIEWS 329 



minimum— simple belief in a personal Deity— fits very badly into the present con- 

 ceptual scheme. This failure to assort seems very real, whatever be its significance. 

 The conceptual scheme of the totemistic Australian who classes himself with a 

 kangaroo is obviously different from ours. A system of concepts that has changed 

 once may change again — the present incompatibility between Theism and thought 

 may be superseded by a harmony and the supersession may come to-morrow and 

 remain for ever. Religion may root in a conviction that is essentially independent 

 of our stumbling efforts to think things out. The past has taught us to be humble 

 and to avoid a dogmatic obstinacy in opinion. But whatever the future may 

 reveal, the present conflict between Theism and thought is evident. The work 

 under discussion is the exposition of a master who believes in God and in the 

 sound philosophy of his belief. These Gifford Lectures are noble in spirit, pro- 

 found in conception, and able in execution ; but they cannot conceal the failure of 

 modern thought to place the "Idea of God" in organic connection with its con- 

 ceptions and implications. 



Chapter IV. is headed "The Liberating Influence of Biology." "Liberating" 

 because biology has broken the spell cast over thought by " the mechanistic 

 tradition," though that " is still strong, among the ' old guard ' of physiologists." 

 It is very commonly supposed, more particularly in popular discussion, that we 

 have to choose between the horns of a sharply defined dilemma — if mechanism be 

 inadequate or false, then religious, or at any rate theistic, belief is the only alter- 

 native. Prof. Pringle-Pattison knows that the problem is not so circumscribed, 

 but he hardly seems aware that biology is even more dangerous to Theism than 

 mechanism or naturism. The change of conception in passing from mechanistic 

 interpretation to the notion of the organism corresponds to the transfer of emphasis 

 already noted between Hume and Kant — not rigidly or in detail, but in principle. 

 To these two centres of emphasis correspond two ideas or conceptions, between 

 which the notion of Deity has constantly oscillated. " The Potter and the Clay " 

 is typical of one of these notions— the notion of the Artificer. Hume noted that 

 " Hesiod, and all the ancient mythologists . . . universally explained the origin of 

 nature from animal birth . . . ," and remarks, through Philo in the Dialogues, 

 that if the universe more resembles an animal or vegetable than a work of human 

 art it should have originated as the former originate and not through reason or 

 design. This is the second notion — the notion of Generation. The argument 

 from design connects with the notion of artificer. If the universe be an executed 

 plan, then Theism is established, since the artificer remains when his work is 

 performed. If there is no evidence of an artificer it is still possible to suppose 

 that a God exists whose purposes are beyond our comprehension. The artificer 

 notion, whether substantiated or not, is not fatal to Theism. But the notion of 

 generation is more likely to be fatal. To transform the concept of artificer into 

 the concept of generation, the artificer must become what he creates — the world, 

 with the living creatures that inhabit it, replaces the being that brings it forth and, 

 if it represent a God at all, represents a God who is dead. This is simply a first 

 approach to the significance of regarding the universe under the category of 

 organism. Theism depends on the principle that the superior existence precedes 

 the inferior. If we gather the principles of organic growth from our experience of 

 their operation we are forced to the opposite conclusion. Man proceeds from the 

 amosba — the lower grows into the higher. If we decide to search out the origins 

 of human institutions, of human conceptions (including religion or Theism itself), 

 of language, of societies, we naturally look for something ruder, simpler, and lower 

 in the scale of organisation than the final results we are explaining. " Idealism 



