REVIEWS 189 



however, be warned that the title may be misinterpreted. The philosophy is not 

 practical in the ordinary sense of the word. In the words of the author, " The 

 Philosophy of the Practical cannot be practical philosophy." The author, indeed, 

 in some passages expresses the opinion that it is unphilosophic to attempt to 

 deduce a practical conclusion from a philosophical premise. The volume is an 

 essay in metaphysics, beautifully written, and the author is fortunate to find 

 a translator, himself a poet, who has so keen a sense of literary form. The 

 reviewer is unable to judge the accuracy of the translation, but can pay the 

 compliment that the volume reads like an original work. 



Unfortunately, however, the translator insists on writing a preface. And the 

 preface attracts attention, irritates, and excites opposition. How far the author 

 would appreciate the remarks is doubtful. One remembers Swift's account of the 

 meeting of Aristotle and his critics in the truthful atmosphere of the underworld. 

 On the other hand, we must not forget the more practical side. If metaphysicians 

 were not admired by pupils who misunderstood them, 1 they would have no readers 

 at all. We are, however, interested to note that "the so-called Synthetic Philosophy 

 (really psychology) of Herbert Spencer was one of the many powerful influences 

 abroad, tending to divert youthful minds from the truth path of knowledge. . . . 

 Spencer tries to force Life into a brass bottle of his own making, but the genius 

 will not go into the bottle." Other philosophers wait for the guileless youth (who 

 is foolish enough to prefer philosophy to sport ?) with mask and rapier at the 

 corner of every thicket. " Croce alone has defined and allocated the activities 

 of the human spirit, he alone has plumbed and charted its ocean in all its depth 

 and breadth." This is somewhat crude. It is perfectly legitimate, in philosophy, 

 to express any opinion whatever, but statements of this kind should be disguised 

 in the recognised setting of dialectic ornamentation. 



Concerning the book itself, it is not now possible to describe the system or to 

 compare it with those of other philosophers. The statement quoted above is 

 descriptive to the extent that Croce duly discusses the views of many great 

 philosophers and substitutes his own for theirs. We must assume that these 

 systems satisfy some demand of the human mind. No one has recognised the 

 necessity for successive metaphysical systems and their tentative nature more 

 clearly than Mr. Bradley. ". . . existing philosophies cannot answer this purpose. 

 For whether there is progress or not, at all events there is change ; and the 

 changed minds of each generation will require a difference in what has to satisfy 

 the intellect. Hence there is as much reason for new philosophy as there is 

 for new poetry. In each case the new production is usually much inferior to 

 something already in existence, and yet it answers a purpose for it appeals more 

 personally to the reader " {Appearance and Reality, p. 6). 



To extant and recent metaphysicians, Bradley, James and the pragmatists, 

 Bergson, we must now add Croce. Whether or no the newcomer is likely to 

 satisfy the quasi-aesthetic need which calls for metaphysics, only time can show. 

 The reviewer is strongly opposed to the trend of that part of the argument which 

 asserts so absolute and impassable a gulf between a philosophy of the practical and 

 practical philosophy. But that fundamental we cannot discuss here. 



H. S. S. 



1 It is as well to state that I am not accusing Mr. Ainslie of any specific misunder- 

 standing of Croce. The sense of the remark is that of the proverbial definition of 

 metaphysics : " When a man who does not know what he is talking about addresses 

 a number of people who do not understand him, that is metaphysics." 



