ESSAYS 66 1 



Militarism cannot, therefore, be held responsible for war, inasmuch as war 

 existed long before modern militarism was evolved. 



To what extent were Fear or Ambition responsible for the late Great 



European Wars? 



The war of 1866 was certainly due to the desire of Prussia to establish her 

 supremacy in Germany and to build up a German Empire. The desire originated 

 in the consciousness that the various German States, being separate and distinct 

 communities, were not in a proper condition to resist aggression. Austria, the 

 nominal head of Germany, had displayed such incompetence as to render it 

 patent to all that she was unfitted to champion the cause of the German peoples 

 or to weld them into a nation. The war of 1866 resulted, therefore, from a 

 combination of fear and ambition ; but that ambition can hardly be termed other 

 than legitimate. 



The war of 1870-71 was due partly to the desire of the Germans to establish 

 their empire firmly, and partly to the fear lest the French, jealous of the Prussian 

 military successes, should attack the North German Confederation. The well- 

 known military maxim of attacking the enemy before he was ready was put into 

 practice by the Germans ; and, as a means to that end, the most thorough pre-war 

 preparations were made — while the war was precipitated at a suitable moment by 

 most unscrupulous methods. The unready and inefficient condition of the French 

 was certainly well known to the Germans. Thus it appears that the war of 

 1870-71 was due more to ambition than to fear. Was German ambition legitimate 

 in this case also ? It is difficult to say. The methods adopted by the Germans 

 can, however, only be justified by the fact that the French would certainly have 

 adopted similar methods had they recognised the expediency and possessed the 

 capacity. For the French were, undoubtedly, jealous of the rise of Prussia, and 

 the whole nation greeted the outbreak of war with enthusiasm, confident in their 

 power to break up the German Confederation. The French Government had, 

 moreover, taken^teps to obtain the assistance of Austria ; neither had it hesitated, 

 shortly before, to propose a secret treaty to Prussia for the partition of the helpless 

 Belgium. French diplomacy, indeed, was not less unscrupulous than that of the 

 Prussians, but merely less competent. Thus the Germans had good reason to fear 

 the French, and as a defensive measure their ambition can be justified. Inci- 

 dentally, it is a noteworthy point that, at that time, the modern system of con- 

 scription had not been introduced into France. Hence unscrupulous diplomacy 

 cannot be ascribed solely to militarism. Neither can it be ascribed solely to 

 autocratic Government ; for Napoleon III. was by no means an autocrat. 



It was after 1870 that German militarism changed its nature and, confident in 

 its power, became over-bearing, arrogant, and more utterly unscrupulous than ever. 

 This lack of scruple was due to the fact that the lack of scruple paid— as was 

 evident to the German leaders from their study of history. It had paid in 1870 ; 

 it paid Napoleon ; it paid Frederick the Great ; it has always paid ; and this late 

 great war is the first notable exception to the rule. It is still doubtful, indeed, 

 whether the Germans will not benefit by it in the end ; for, while inflicting the 

 most cruel punishment on their adversaries, they have so far, in comparison, 

 suffered but little themselves. 



In 1914 the Germans were again deliberate aggressors. They have shown the 

 world on a hundred occasions that they were fully conscious of their overwhelming 

 strength as against France and Russia. The Russians, however, had commenced 



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