"MATHEMATICS AND CHEMISTRY": A REPLY 391 



what he says of the latter, it would appear that things have 

 not improved very much since the time when Richter (1789) 

 made the statement which is quoted in my book (p. 5) : ". . . the 

 most prominent chemists occupy themselves little with mathe- 

 matics and the mathematicians feel that they have little business 

 in the province of chemistry"; for we are now told that 

 " chemists, as a rule, know very little mathematics but even 

 when they have received what is considered to be a fair amount 

 of mathematical training they only too frequently find that their 

 knowledge is not sufficient to enable them to deal with the 

 practical problems that arise ; unfortunately, they also too often 

 find that the mathematician has not sufficient chemical know- 

 ledge and feeling to give them the assistance they need." The 

 advance probably lies in the raising of the standard of what 

 is considered to be a fair amount of mathematical training, 

 which is now certainly higher than that which sufficed in 

 Richter's day. 



This attitude the writer considers to be due to a real incom- 

 patibility of the chemical and mathematical habits of thought 

 a view which is reasonable enough in itself but which leads 

 him to what is clearly a fundamental error in natural philosophy. 

 After saying that " it must be admitted that chemical problems 

 are frequently of such a nature that it is impossible to be certain 

 of anything; the chemist frequently does not know what he 

 wants to prove nor indeed does he want to prove anything; 

 he wants merely to put a reasonable interpretation upon certain 

 experimental results," Mr. Worley tells us that "chemical 

 properties are the expression of the reciprocal behaviour of 

 substances, not absolute quantities; on this account it is very 

 difficult to quantify such properties : often they can be felt but 

 not figured." 



The word " feeling " or " feels " occurs in fact no fewer than 

 five times on the same page and it is quite clear that the author 

 is referring to that medieval doctrine of the Discrimination of 

 the Scientific Instinct which, although it should have received 

 its death-blow when Columbus circumnavigated the earth, is 

 apparently still very much alive. Does Mr. Worley seriously 

 ask us to believe that it is safe to rely on our feelings when 

 deciding a scientific problem ? One example ?of the results of 

 this procedure is given in my book (p. 4); at the risk of being 

 tedious to my readers I will add a few more. Could we reason- 



