THE SPECTRE OF VITALISM 451 



Personally I greatly prefer the Bible explanation. Driesch 

 finally states that there are " three windows into the absolute " : 

 the thou, the ego and the it. I fear most people will find these 

 windows too thickly glazed to help them much. For myself I 

 confess I was completely puzzled as to what an " it " might be : 

 and was not greatly enlightened by the definition " the character 

 of givenness." But I merely mention these fatuities to provide 

 an example of what we may be reduced to, if we begin by 

 believing in vitalism. 



Driesch is good enough to describe the opinions of those who 

 differ from him as " materialistic dogmatism " and adds in a lofty 

 manner that he has " nothing to do with dogmatism of any kind." 

 I fear this very superior attitude is not justified by the remainder 

 of the work. By " dogmatism " is usually meant the arrogant 

 expression of an unsupported assertion. Surely then it cannot 

 be applied to physiological mechanism — which is held by the 

 immense majority of physiologists, in contradiction to the wholly 

 unsupported assertion of vitalism. It is clear that Driesch uses 

 the term "dogmatism" as a conveniently stinking carcase to 

 fling at opponents. Indeed, in scarcely any branch of natural 

 science is it possible to express firm belief in some ascertained 

 truth without being called a dogmatist : and that too by people 

 who are prepared at any moment to believe in any rubbish 

 that comes along, without a particle of evidence ; moreover, to 

 cherish the idea with that bigoted and cursed obstinacy that 

 is commonly found in alliance with extreme ignorance. 



To sum up, we find that the non-metaphysical arguments 

 against mechanism amount to this : " We cannot conceive how 

 mechanical forces could work such a result : therefore they 

 cannot : therefore vitalism is true." That is the entire substance 

 of Driesch's three proofs of vitalism. It is useless for me to 

 insist further on the fact that our inability to understand how a 

 process works is no argument in favour of its incapacity to work. 

 It is useless for me to name such discoveries as wireless 

 telegraphy or Rontgen rays, in evidence of the fact that physical 

 means may produce results that w r ere a short time previously 

 held to be wholly impossible. And it is useless for this reason : 

 that any one who does not instantly perceive the futility of this 

 kind of logic is not likely to be converted by the most frappant 

 examples of its failure. 



