452 SCIENCE PROGRESS 



The Views of Sir Oliver Lodge 



Not by me at least ! Let me therefore pass on to the dictum of 

 one who is commonly classed as a friend of vitalism, Sir Oliver 

 Lodge. In a critical article upon the views of Prof. Schafer, 

 published in the Contemporary Review for October, Sir Oliver 

 makes a trenchant protest against founding positive doctrines 

 upon nescience or upon any kind of negation. The vitalist 

 position, as I have endeavoured to point out, is founded mainly 

 (with Driesch entirely) on the negative position that we cannot 

 imagine how mechanism could work. Sir Oliver is thinking 

 mainly of theologians ; but his criticism is equally cogent against 

 vitalists and the reason which he gives is equally applicable in 

 the two cases. " Theologians," he says, " have probably learnt 

 by this time that their central tenets should not be founded, even 

 partially, upon nescience or upon negations of any kind ; lest the 

 placid progress of positive knowledge should once more under- 

 mine their position and another discovery have to be scouted 

 with alarmed and violent anathemas." 



But Sir Oliver, notwithstanding his admirable criticism of 

 the chief error in vitalist logic, is himself regrettably disposed 

 to explain away difficulties by the manufacture of metaphysical 

 entities. Criticising Prof. Schafer he says, " He realises his 

 limitations and definitely excludes the word ' soul ' from his 

 consideration ; thus proving himself to be in that respect not 

 only scientific, in the narrow sense, but genuinely philosophic." 

 I assume that Prof. Schafer excluded the "soul" from his con- 

 sideration because he had other things more interesting to talk 

 about ; but it is very difficult to see how he is to be praised for 

 any special scientific virtue in choosing (as he was entitled to 

 do) those other subjects. Sir Oliver's suggestion is, of course, 

 that the " soul " is the concern of metaphysics and not of science ; 

 or if of science, not of biology but of psychology. And in a 

 sense he is right : in the same sense that a rattle is the concern 

 of a baby and not of a grown man. But if he means that there 

 can be any knowledge of "soul" or any statement about it 

 that is outside the domain of natural science, then he is wrong. 

 Science is knowledge organised and systematised ; all know- 

 ledge is of the nature of natural science. There is no knowledge 

 of the nature of metaphysics outside the range of natural science. 

 Hence, if the conception of a " soul " is to be accepted at all, it 



