Ch~>. IV. Moral Sense. 99 



behind it a very vivid impression. It is clear that many in- 

 stinctive desires, such as that of hunger, are in their nature oi 

 short duration ; and after being satisfied, are not readily or 

 ■sividly recalled. Thirdly, after the power of language had been 

 acquired, and the wishes of the community could be expressed, 

 the common opinion how each member ought to act for the 

 public good, would naturally become in a paramount degree 

 the guide to action. But it should be borne in mind that how- 

 ever great weight we may attribute to public opinion, our regard 

 for the approbation and disapprobation of our fellows depends 

 on sympathy, which, as we shall see, forms an essential part of 

 the social instinct, and is indeed its foundation-stone, Lastly, 

 habit in the individual would ultimately play a very important 

 part in guiding the conduct of each member ; for the social in- 

 stinct, together with sympathy, is, like any other instinct, greatly 

 strengthened by habit, and so consequently would be obedience 

 to the wishes and judgment of the community. These several 

 subordinate propositions must now be discussed, and some of 

 them at considerable length. 



It may be well first to premise that I do not wish to maintain 

 that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual faculties were 

 to become as active and as highly developed as in man, would 

 acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours. In the same 

 manner as various animals have some sense of beauty, though 

 they admire widely different objects, so they might have a sense 

 of right and wrong, though led by it to follow widely different 

 lines of conduct. If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men 

 were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, 

 there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, 

 like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, 

 and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters ; and no 

 one would think of interfering. 6 Nevertheless, the bee, or any 



6 Mr. H. Sidgwick remarks, in in Morals,' 'Theological Review,' 



an able discussion on this subject April, 1872, p. 188-191) on the 



(the 'Academy,' June loth, 1872, same illustration, says, the prin- 



(p. 2ol), "a superior bee, we may ciplcs of social duty would be thus 



" feel sure, would aspire to a milder reversed^; and by this, I presume, 



•' solution of the population ques- she means that the fulfilment of a 



" tion." Judging, however, from social duty would tend to the injury 



the habits of many or most savages, of individuals; but she overlooks 



man solves the problem by famale the fact, which she would doubtless 



infanticide, polyandry and promis- admit, that the instincts of the bee 



cuous intercourse ; therefore it may have been acquired for the good of 



well be doubted whether it would the community. She goes so far as 



be by a milder method. Miss to say that if the theory of ethics 



t'obbe, in commenting (' Darwinism advocated in this chapter were evei 



