98 T lie Descent of Man. Part I, 



dependent interest, as an attempt to see how far the study of 

 the lower animals throws light on one of the highest psychical 

 faculties of man. 



The following proposition seems to me in a high degree 

 probable — namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with 

 well marked social instincts, 5 the parental and filial affections 

 'x-ing here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or 

 joiiscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, 

 or nearly as well developed, as in man. Fox, firstly, the social 

 instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its 

 fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to 

 perform various services for them. The services may be of a 

 definite and evidently instinctive nature ; or there may be only 

 a wish and readiness, as with most of the higher social animals, 

 to aid their fellows in certain general ways. But these feelings 

 and services are by no means extended to all the individuals of 

 the same species, only to those of the same association. Secondly, 

 as soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, 

 images of all past actions and motives would be incessantly 

 passing through the brain of each individual ; and that feeling 

 of dissatisfaction, or even misery, which invariably results, as we 

 shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied instinct, would arise, 

 as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always 

 present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the • 

 time stronger, but neither enduring in its nature, nor leaving 



5 Sir B. Brodie, aftei observing all this, he also remarks, "if, as is 



that man is a social animal (' Psy- " my own belief, the moral feelings 



chological Enquiries,' 1854, p. 192), " are not innate, but acquired, they 



asks the pregnant question, " ought " are not for that reason less natu- 



" not this to settle the disputed " ral." It is with hesitation that I 



" question as to the existence of a venture to differ at all from so 



" moral sense ?" Similar ideas have profound a thinker, but it can 



probably occurred to many persons, hardly be disputed that the social 



as they did long ago to Marcus feelings are instinctive or innate in 



Aurelius. Mr. J. S. Mill speaks, in the lower animals; and why should 



his celebrated work, 'Utilitarian- they not be so in man? Mr. Bain 



ism,' (1864, pp. 45, 46), of the social (see, for instance, 'The Emotions and 



feelings as a "powerful natural the Will,' 1865, p. 481) and others 



'"sentiment," and as "the natural believe that the moral sense is ac- 



" basis of sentiment for utilitarian quired by each individual during 



" morality." Again he says, " Like his lifetime. On the general theory 



" tin 3 other acquired capacities above of evolution this is at least ex- 



*'• referred to, the moral faculty, if tremely improbable. The ignoring 



" not a part of our nature, is of all transmitted mental qualities 



" a natural out-growth from it ; will, as it seems to me, be hereafter 



" capable, like them, in a certain judged as a most serious blemish in 



" small degree of springing up spon- the works of Mr. Mill. 

 " taneously." But in opposition to 



